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Deference Mistakes
Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette*
This Article begins with what should seem a relatively straightforward
proposition: it is impossible to fully understand the holding of a case without
understanding its “deference regime”—the standard of review or burden of proof
that governs the case. If a court holds in the context of a habeas petition that a
constitutional right was not “clearly established,” that does not mean that the court
would hold that the right does not exist were it writing on a blank slate. If a court
refuses to invalidate a granted patent, which is presumed valid and can only be held
invalid upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, that does not mean that
the court believes the patent should have been granted in the first place. And if an
appellate court holds that a trial court’s ruling was not “plain error,” that does not
mean that the appellate court believes the trial court necessarily reached the correct
result or would have affirmed the ruling if the review were more searching.
Yet in case after case, we find that judges (and their clerks) confuse one
deference regime for another or ignore deference entirely. In so doing, they make
what we term deference mistakes. Courts in standard criminal cases regularly rely upon
habeas precedents holding that a federal right was not “clearly established” to
conclude that the right does not exist. The Federal Circuit and the Patent and
Trademark Office regularly rely on precedents involving granted patents (which are
presumed valid) to justify granting new patents (which are not entitled to that
presumption). And courts of appeals regularly rely upon “plain error” precedents to
justify holdings in cases where the standard of review is less deferential.
Although the problem of deference mistakes cuts across legal doctrines, it
has been neither identified nor described in prior scholarship. Our article presents a
multitude of examples of deference mistakes in practice and explains why they are
likely to occur. Deference mistakes may seem relatively innocuous, particularly if
they are confined to individual cases. But that appearance is misleading. We develop
a theoretical model of how deference mistakes, coupled with particular asymmetries
in adjudication, can generate systematic shifts in legal doctrine. Deference mistakes
may have contributed to the current patent crisis by adding to the proliferation of
bad patents. They may also be partly responsible for retrenchment in the law of
constitutional criminal procedure rights or the pro-employer shift in employment
discrimination law. After analyzing the potential for deference mistakes to affect the
long-term evolution of the law, we discuss potential solutions.

* Jonathan S. Masur is Deputy Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette is a Visiting Fellow with the Yale Law School Information
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Introduction
A district court relies on Eighth Circuit precedent to conclude that a
claimed federal right does not exist—but the Eighth Circuit court had only
held that the right was not “clearly established” for purposes of habeas
corpus.1 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) relies on Federal Circuit
precedent in granting a patent application—but the Federal Circuit had only
held that the challenger to a granted patent had not presented “clear and
convincing” evidence to overcome the presumption of patent validity.2 A
district court relies on Seventh Circuit precedent in granting an employer’s
summary judgment motion in an employment discrimination case—but the
Seventh Circuit had only held that a finding of no discriminatory intent was
not “clearly erroneous.”3
In all of these cases, the second decisionmaker made a “deference
mistake”: it mistakenly relied on precedent without fully accounting for the
legal and factual deference regime under which that precedent was decided,
thereby using the precedent in a way that the initial decisionmaker may not
have intended. We use “deference” broadly to refer to anything that causes a
decisionmaker to consider an issue differently from how it would in the first
instance, including different standards of review, standards of evidence, or
legal presumptions. Just because an evidentiary holding is not an abuse of
discretion does not mean that the contrary holding is not allowed. Just
because a finding of negligence is not clearly erroneous does not mean that
courts should find negligence in every similar factual scenario.
These types of mistakes might seem minor. After all, courts make
small errors of many types on a regular basis. What are a few more here or
there? And in many instances, deference mistakes will have no net effect on
1 In Newton v. Kemna, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although “the Supreme Court has
recognized in other circumstances that constitutional rights can trump evidentiary privileges,”
“[g]iven the restrictive nature of habeas review,” it was not their “province to speculate as to
whether the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would find that Missouri’s physician-patient
privilege must give way to a defendant’s desire to use psychiatric records in cross-examination.”
354 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2004). A later district court erroneously relied on Newton in rejecting a
party’s request for a witness’s medical records, stating that Newton “held that the trial court’s denial
of the criminal defendant’s access to the witness’s medical records did not violate the
confrontation clause under the Sixth Amendment.” Jackson v. Wiersema Charter Serv., Inc., No.
4:08-CV-00027, 2009 WL 1531815, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 1, 2009).
2 See, e.g., Ex parte Albritton, No. 2008-5023, 2009 WL 671577, at *16 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 13,
2009) (reversing an obviousness rejection in a “close case” based on Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene
Larew Tackie, Inc., 119 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
3 In Oxman v. WLS-TV, the Seventh Circuit stated that while “it [would be] reasonable to
infer that [the] statements [of a television station’s News Director] reflected [the] opinions [of the
station’s General Manager with exclusive authority to fire employees], . . . such an inference is not
mandated,” and that the district court’s decision to exclude the News Director’s statements was
“not clearly erroneous.” 12 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 1993). In granting summary judgment for the
employer in another employment discrimination case, a later district court relied on Oxman to
conclude that the intentions of someone without firing authority “are irrelevant” and “not
evidence of discrimination.” Respondi v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 96-C-2618, 1998 WL 355447,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 1998).
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doctrinal development: some district judges might mistakenly rely on
precedent to exclude evidence they otherwise would (within their discretion)
allow, while others might mistakenly rely on other precedent to allow
evidence they would otherwise exclude.
But when some asymmetry in the system results in a skewed
distribution of deference mistakes, their overall effect will not be so
innocuous. If one type of deference mistake comes to predominate over the
other—for instance, if there are many more cases of erroneous exclusions of
evidence than erroneous admissions—the result will be a systematic shift in the
doctrine. This doctrinal evolution is problematic even if the “mistakes” are
made by decisionmakers who rule differently from how they otherwise would
for strategic, reversal-averse reasons.4
For example, imagine if litigants appealed evidentiary rulings
admitting evidence much more frequently than rulings excluding evidence.5
Appellate courts would have many more opportunities to consider admissions
of evidence, and the appellate caselaw would be skewed toward deferential
affirmances (and reversals) of those admissions. Subsequent courts would thus
have many more opportunities to make deference mistakes with respect to
admissions of evidence than with respect to exclusions. The long-term result
would be legal bias in the direction of admitting more and more evidence.6
Of course, for this mechanism to result in a shift in doctrine, the
appellate court must grant deference on something that matters in future
cases. In general, appellate courts only defer on case-specific factual
determinations, while reviewing legal questions without deference. In
practice, however, decisions on facts often infect decisions on law, and courts
have recognized the difficulty of separating legal and factual determinations
by declaring some issues to be “mixed questions of law and fact,” which are
often reviewed deferentially.7
Furthermore, there are a few areas in which legal questions are
reviewed under different standards in different situations. These areas of
doctrine can be especially fertile grounds for deference mistakes. For
example, patent invalidity must be established by clear and convincing
evidence in the infringement context, but only by a preponderance of the

This work thus joins a broader literature on extra-legal determinants of doctrinal pathways.
See generally David Freeman Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation
(2014) (unpublished manuscript) (describing this literature and presenting a new theory of how the
choice of private versus public enforcement can systematically shift doctrine).
4

5 This might occur for forensic evidence because criminal appeals are almost always made by
defendants, who would be more likely to complain about the admission of incriminating evidence.
See infra Section II.B.2.
6 This mechanism is analogous to models in the natural sciences of biased, correlated random
walks, under which small, random fluctuations of particles can lead to net movement in one
direction when those random steps are biased in one direction or correlated with prior steps. See
generally Edward A. Codling et al., Random Walk Models in Biology, 5 J. ROYAL. SOC’Y INTERFACE
813 (2008) (reviewing such models).
7 See infra Section I.A.
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evidence when validity is challenged before the PTO.8 Just because there is
not clear and convincing evidence that a patent is invalid does not mean that
it should not be held invalid under a lower standard. It is often a mistake for
the PTO to rely on precedent from infringement cases when deciding to
grant patents.9 Similarly, courts consider whether federal rights are “clearly
established” in the habeas and qualified immunity contexts, rather than
considering whether these rights exist at all.10 It is a mistake to rely on
precedent that a right is not “clearly established” to conclude that it is “clearly
not established.”
In Part I, we explain why we expect deference mistakes to occur. First,
we review the various deference regimes (again, using our broad definition of
“deference”) and describe a number of situations in which appellate
decisionmakers grant deference on issues that matter in future cases. Second,
we review the literature and cases on the extent to which deference regimes
actually affect outcomes, and we conclude that deference likely does matter to
at least some extent. Finally, we discuss factors that might cause courts to
make deference mistakes—where we use “mistake” to refer to the kinds of
legal errors discussed above.
Part II then presents numerous examples of actual deference mistakes.
For instance, we show that courts have erroneously relied upon precedents
holding that a given right was not “clearly established” (in the context of a
petition for habeas) in concluding that a right does not exist. The PTO and
the Federal Circuit have relied on precedents from suits for patent
infringement—where patents and trademarks carry a presumption of
validity—to justify granting new patents or registering new trademarks (which
are not entitled to that presumption). We also provide examples of criminal
cases in which a precedent involving plain error review—because the
appealing part failed to object at trial—is used to decide a later case subject to
lower standard of deference. We do not claim that deference mistakes are
solely responsible for doctrinal shifts in these areas. Rather, the mechanism
we describe can work in tandem with, or even supplement, shifts based on
changing judicial philosophies and other factors. We do not even claim to
have proven here that our mechanism has in fact caused systematic doctrinal
shifts. What we demonstrate in Part II is simply that all of the elements

8 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678
F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[A] challenger that attacks the validity of patent claims in civil
litigation has a statutory burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. . . . In
contrast, in PTO reexaminations the standard of proof—a preponderance of the evidence—is
substantially lower than in a civil case and there is no presumption of validity in reexamination
proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We will at times use “validity” to refer to the
patentability of patent applications for ease of explication, even though this term is technically
reserved for granted patents.
9 One of us has suggested that this mechanism may have been partially responsible for the
expansion of the boundaries of patentability that has occurred since the creation of the Federal
Circuit. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, What Are the Sources of Patent Inflation? An Analysis of Federal
Circuit Patentability Rulings, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347, 368-71 (2011).
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (habeas); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)
(qualified immunity).
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necessary for our mechanism—including actual examples of deference
mistakes—are present in some doctrinal areas. The extent to which deference
mistakes are driving doctrinal shifts in these or other areas is thus ripe for
empirical study.
In Part III, we present a theoretical model of how deference mistakes
can lead to systematic doctrinal shifts. This model is simplest when the
deference is not to the lower decisionmaker, but rather is a legal presumption,
such that similar cases are sometimes decided under different legal standards
(as in patent and habeas cases). But we also show that when an appellate
decisionmaker defers to a lower decisionmaker, a skewed distribution of
precedents can arise when only one type of party appeals (or appeals more
often), when the deference is one-sided, or when the lower decisionmaker is
likely to be biased relative to the appellate decisionmaker. We then explain
how a skewed distribution of precedents, coupled with the cumulative effect
of innocuous deference mistakes, can lead to systematic doctrinal shifts.
Part IV then explores potential solutions to the problem of deference
mistakes. We consider whether to require that appellate decisionmakers be
more explicit about deference, such as by noting that they might have
reached a different conclusion if they were deciding the case on a clean slate.
In the qualified immunity context, courts are encouraged (and were for a time
required) to decide whether a constitutional right was violated before
deciding whether that right was clearly established.11 This seems to have led
to a fewer formal deference errors than in the habeas context. But the
qualified immunity regime is not necessarily healthier for the development of
constitutional doctrine: it might simply cause courts to overstate the case
against a particular right in order to avoid cognitive dissonance and minimize
the probability of reversal. In any case, because the problem only occurs
when some actor in the system makes a mistake, simply publicizing the
problem is likely to help. Unless decisionmakers become more comfortable
admitting ambiguities, the best hope for avoiding deference mistakes may lie
with increased awareness on the part of decisionmakers, advocates, and
commentators, which will enable these different actors to recognize and
announce such mistakes when they occur.

I. Defining Deference Mistakes
One of the virtues of a system in which judges issue written opinions is
clarity regarding what the judge has actually decided. In the written opinion,
the judge will typically explain both the decision she has reached and the
legal standard under which the decision was made—including such a basic
element as the burden of proof. Of course, this system does not always
function smoothly. Sometimes a judge is not clear regarding what she has
decided or the standard she has applied. Other times a judge is clear, but
subsequent courts and litigants misinterpret what she has written. It is difficult
11

See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011).
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to imagine a subsequent court mistaking which party actually won an earlier
case, but occasionally a court will err in interpreting the burden of proof that
a previous judge applied.
A mistake regarding the appropriate burden of proof in a prior case
may not, at first glance, appear particularly important. It might seem like a
highly technical legal mistake, of interest only to legal sticklers (or pedants).
But this impression would be misleading. Misunderstanding the burden of
proof in operation in an earlier case is often equivalent to misunderstanding
the legal decision on the merits. For example, if a court holds that a right is
not clearly established in the habeas or qualified immunity contexts, and that
court is misunderstood to have held that a right is clearly not established, it
creates a precedent (at least in the opinion of the misinterpreting court) that
may be precisely the opposite of what the first court would actually have
decided had the issue been presented to it.
For deference mistakes to matter, three key elements must be present.
First, courts must sometimes grant deference (in our broad sense of the term)
on issues that matter in future cases in ways that might be asymmetric.
Second, legal deference regimes must actually affect outcomes in at least some
cases. And third, courts must sometimes make deference mistakes: they must
rely on precedent, in a way that the issuing court may not have intended, by
failing to fully account for the legal and factual deference regime under which
that precedent was decided. In this Part, we argue that these three elements
are present in the U.S. legal system.
A. What Is Deference?
Judicial deference can be a “slippery concept to define precisely.”12
For this Article, we use deference in its broadest sense to include any situation
in which a second decisionmaker is influenced by the judgment of some initial
decisionmaker, rather than examining an issue entirely de novo.13 In our
model, these decisionmakers might be courts, agencies, or a variety of other
government actors.14

12 Jonathan M. Justl, Note, Disastrously Misunderstood: Judicial Deference in the Japanese-American
Cases, 119 YALE L.J. 270, 285 (2009); see Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1983).
13 We thus adopt a broader definition than Paul Horwitz, who was hesitant about using
“deference” to describe “a thumb on the scales but not a complete surrender of judgment,” or
where “some independent controlling authority dictates to [C2] that it defer to [C1].” Paul
Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1076 (2008). We also adopt a
broader definition than commentators who have focused on deference only to facts. See, e.g.,
Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV.
941, 946 (1999).

For example, Daniel Solove has noted that the Supreme Court “frequently accords
deference to the judgments of numerous decisionmakers in the bureaucratic state: Congress, the
Executive, state legislatures, agencies, military officials, prison officials, professionals, prosecutors,
employers, and practically any other decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise.”
Solove, supra note 13, at 944.
14
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Deference might be granted through a variety of mechanisms. Federal
courts often review lower courts and agencies under deferential standards of
review, such as clear error (for district court factfinding15), plain error (for
issues not raised below16), substantial evidence (for jury verdicts17 and certain
agency factfinding18), and abuse of discretion (for many procedural and
evidentiary determinations).19 Deference might also be granted due to legal
presumptions coupled with standards of evidence or burdens of proof. For
example, the presumption of patent validity, under which invalidity must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence (rather than a preponderance of the
evidence),20 requires courts to grant some deference to the PTO’s
determination of patent validity. And as we describe further below, many
other specific deference regimes are required by statute or have been
developed by courts.
Because we are only interested in deference as it affects doctrinal
development, the variable on which deference is granted must be something
that matters in subsequent cases. Agencies frequently receive deference on
legal determinations under Chevron or other agency deference regimes,21 and
it would be erroneous for another decisionmaker to rely on one of these
deferential precedents as if it were de novo review. But outside the Chevron
context, one might question whether courts in fact defer on issues that would
be relevant in the future. Questions of law are almost universally reviewed
without deference;22 instead, deference is typically granted on case-specific
facts, known as “adjudicative facts,” which (by definition) are supposed to be
unimportant in subsequent cases.23 If this formal law/fact division were clear
and precisely followed, so that any issue that might be relevant in a
subsequent case were always reviewed de novo (functionally as well as
formally), the deference mistakes at the heart of our model would never
occur.

15

See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6).

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Errors that do “not affect substantial rights” are considered
“harmless” and “must be disregarded.” Id. 52(a). While we do not focus on them here, the rules
for harmless error are themselves complex.
17 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974).
16

18 Agency factfinding is reviewed for substantial evidence when it results from formal
adjudication and rulemaking; other agency actions are reviewed for whether they are “arbitrary
and capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012).
19 See generally STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW (4th ed. 2010) (summarizing the standards of review employed by federal courts).
20 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243
(2011).

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098-1120 (2008).
21

22 See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (2009)
(criticizing universal de novo review of legal issues).
23 See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (“Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of
the particular case.”); supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
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The real world, however, is not so precisely divided. Some facts are
relevant in many cases—these “legislative facts” might be found by courts or
legislatures,24 and they are sometimes granted deference.25 Even adjudicative
facts might be relevant in subsequent cases if those facts infect decisionmaking
on law; for example, an appellate court that only sees particular factual
postures might subconsciously shape the law to fit those facts.
There is also no clear divide between fact and law: the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the boundary is “slippery”26 and “vexing,”27
and scholars have questioned the coherence of the distinction.28 Legally
imbued issues that have been deemed questions of fact—and which are thus
reviewed deferentially—include whether there was discriminatory intent in an
employment discrimination case,29 whether an exemption to the Fair Labor
Standards Act applies in a particular case,30 and negligence and causation in
tort cases (except in the Second Circuit).31 Some issues have been explicitly
called “mixed questions of law and fact,” and the standard of review for these
issues varies.32 Wright and Miller has compiled a long list of issues “that
certainly seem to contain both legal and factual elements” but that have been
reviewed for clear error, including the scope of a fiduciary relationship, the
existence of a contract, the likelihood of consumer confusion about
trademarks, and the existence of personal jurisdiction.33 In any of these cases,
an appellate court might grant deference to a district court decision on an
issue that matters in future cases, such as a conclusion that an employer’s
seniority system does not reflect discriminatory intent,34 or about the extent of
a speeding driver’s contributory negligence.35
Appellate courts also apply deferential review to many decisions that
involve legal judgments that may be relevant in subsequent cases, including

See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note (“Legislative facts . . . are those which
have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a
legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”).
24

25 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1, 49 (2011); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 IND.
L.J. 1 (2009).
26 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 385 (2000) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.
99, 111 (1995)).
27 Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
28 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 1769, 1790 (2003); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992).
29 Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 290.
30 Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 713 (1986).
31 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 2.28.
32 See 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 2589 (3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Lowry Dev., L.L.C. v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., Inc., 690 F.3d 382, 385
(5th Cir. 2012) (applying different standards of review to distinct aspects of a single issue).
33 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, § 2589 (footnotes omitted).
34 See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 290.
35 See Pohl v. Cnty. of Furnas, 682 F.3d 745, 754 (8th Cir. 2012).
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evidentiary rulings,36 injunctions,37 sentences,38 attorneys’ fees and
sanctions,39 declaratory jurisdiction (in some circuits),40 and numerous other
issues.41 This deference means that a given case may have more than one
acceptable conclusion.42 If an appellate court affirms one such outcome—the
exclusion of a certain type of expert testimony, or the denial of an injunction
under certain circumstances—future district courts may rely on that
precedent without realizing that admitting the testimony or granting the
injunction would also be within their discretion.
Finally, as we will discuss in much greater detail in Part II, courts
sometimes evaluate issues more deferentially based on specific statutory
requirements. As mentioned, courts must evaluate granted patents more
deferentially than they would in the examination context due to the
presumption of patent validity.43 Similarly, courts must evaluate habeas
petitions more deferentially than direct criminal appeals due to the
requirement that relief may be granted only where there was a violation of
“clearly established Federal law.”44 Where statutes require review of similar
issues under different standards in different contexts, deference mistakes may
be especially pernicious.
In sum, decisionmakers often grant deference (broadly defined) on
issues that matter in future cases. This brief review of deference regimes has
focused on U.S. federal law, but similar mechanisms may also be at play at
the international, state,45 and local levels.46 All that is needed is for one

36 General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (noting that decisions on whether to admit expert testimony
are subject to abuse-of-discretion review).

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (permanent injunctions);
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004) (preliminary injunctions).
38 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
37

39 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990) (whether sanctions are
justified under Rule 11); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558-563 (1988) (whether a U.S.
litigation position was “substantially justified” for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act). Note that prior to Pierce v. Underwood, the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit had treated
substantial justification as a question of law subject to de novo review. 487 U.S. at 558.

See Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. M/V Capt. W.D. Cargill, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the circuit split on this issue).
40

41 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (whether a
punitive damages award is excessive); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 281 (1995)
(whether to stay a declaratory judgment action pending state litigation); I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S.
94, 96 (1988) (whether to reopen deportation proceedings).
42 Cf. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) (“[W]e hold that the District Court’s
[decision] . . . was within its discretion . . . . Other district courts might have reached differing or
opposite conclusions with equal justification, but that does not mean that one conclusion was
‘right’ and the other ‘wrong’.”).
43 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
44 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
45 See, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr, Function over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001); W. Wendell
Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351 (1998).
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authoritative decisionmaker to defer to another decisionmaker on an issue
that will be relevant in the future.
B. Does Deference Matter?
The second key element required by our model is that legal deference
regimes must actually affect outcomes. One reason to believe that standards
of review, legal presumptions, and other deference regimes can matter is that
judges say they do. Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit opens his book
on standards of review by noting that they “are critically important in
determining the parameters of appellate review.”47 Former Tenth Circuit
Chief Judge Deanell Tacha said the standard of review “is everything.”48
Former D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Patricia Wald stated that the appellate
standard of review “more often than not determines the outcome.”49 And
Judge Harry Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit wrote that “[t]he standard of
review is the keystone of appellate decision making” because appellate courts
do not “reweigh all the evidence and find the facts anew,” and he criticized
briefs that “overlook this critical issue.”50
Federal courts require parties to state the applicable standard of
review for each issue,51 and many opinions state that the standard of review
was outcome determinative in that case.52 The Seventh Circuit has
46 Cf. Christopher P. Terry, On the Frontiers of Knowledge: A Flexible Substantial Evidence Standard of
Review for Zoning Board Tower Siting Decisions, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 147 (2002) (discussing
a circuit split over the deference due to zoning board tower siting decisions).
47 HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW, at
v (2007).
48 Id. (quoting Judge Deanell Tacha).
49 Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1371, 1391 (1995).
50 Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other Transgressions, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 431, 437 (1986).
51 See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(B) (requiring briefs to contain “for each issue, a concise
statement of the applicable standard of review”).
52 See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 148 (2005) (Breyer, J. concurring) (“[T]his is a case
in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable conclusions of state-court judges makes a
critical difference.”); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Garrett, 459 F. App’x 524 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The
standard of review makes a difference in some cases, and this is one of them.”); Fantasyland
Video, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 496 F.3d 1040, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Identification of the
proper standard of review under state law will likely determine the outcome of this appeal.”);
Madelux Int’l v. Barama Co., 186 F. App’x 10, 10 (1st Cir. 2006) (“This is an appeal in which the
applicable standard of review determines the outcome.”); Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Ober,
107 F.3d 925, 929 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[T]he pertinent standard of review . . . is decisive in shaping
the outcome of our assessment.”); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[E]ven
though in some cases [the standard of review] might not matter, in others it would, otherwise the
lengthy debates about the meaning of these formulations and the circumstances in which they
apply would be unnecessary.”); United States v. D’Ambrosio, 9 F.3d 1554 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he
standard of review controls the outcome of this case.”); United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200,
1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he standard of review can be outcome determinative.”); Payne v. Borg,
982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The relevant standards of review are critical to the outcome of
this case.”); United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[T]he
standard chosen often affects the outcome of the case.”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Schuylkill
Metals Corp., 828 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1987) (“In this case, the standard of review determines

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

10

memorably stated that a decision will only be overturned under the clearly
erroneous standard if it “strike[s] [the court] as wrong with the force of a fiveweek-old, unrefrigerated dead fish,”53 a metaphor adopted by many other
circuits to illustrate the burden of challenging facts on appeal.54
Commentators agree that standards of review matter and have devoted many
pages to subtle distinctions between standards of review, suggesting that these
distinctions are not entirely meaningless.55
To be sure, legal realists who believe that judicial outcomes are
determined primarily by the facts may be skeptical of the relevance of
deference regimes—although realists do not claim that rules never matter.56
A treatise on federal standards of review begins by emphasizing two points
about the importance of legal practice over formalism: first, that “[t]he
formulations do not say much until the appeals court . . . gives them life,” and
second, that “[e]ven when the slogans have no real internal meaning . . . the
issue framing or assignment of power behind the words is the turning point of
the decision.”57 Thus, for example, the phrase “abuse of discretion” reflects
the sense that appellate courts should not review de novo every minor
evidentiary or procedural determination of trial courts—but “the variety of
matters committed to the discretion of district judges means that the standard
is necessarily variable.”58
Similarly, one might believe that the Federal Circuit uses a higher
standard to invalidate issued patents not because of formal evidentiary

the outcome.”); Fox v. C.I.R., 718 F.2d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The critical issue in this case is
one not discussed by the parties: our standard of review.”).
53 Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988).
54 See, e.g., McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012); L.J. v. Wilbon,
633 F.3d 297, 311 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 888 (6th Cir. 2010).
55 See, e.g., 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 1.01 (“[S]tandards of review—those yardstick
phrases meant to guide the appellate court in approaching both the issues before it and the trial
court’s earlier procedure or result—actually matter. They do affect subsequent courts, trial and
appellate, in doing their job.”); EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 47; Kevin Casey, Jade Camara &
Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and Semantics, 11 FED.
CIRCUIT B.J. 279 (2002); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2441 & nn.62-63 (1998) (“Skeptics may
suggest that, in practice, the standard of review matters little—that judges will manipulate the
standard to reach the results they want. We disagree. Doubtless such manipulation sometimes
happens, but in our experience courts generally do take the standard of review seriously.”). As of
December 22, 2012, there were over six hundred articles in Westlaw’s JLR database with
“standard” (or “standards”) and “review” in the title.
56 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward A Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV.
267, 269, 275 n.39 (1997) (stating that “everyone commonly thought to be a Realist . . . endorses
the following descriptive claim about adjudication: in deciding cases, judges respond primarily to
the stimulus of the facts” but that “[p]roper emphasis must be put on the word ‘primarily’: no
Realists (except perhaps Underhill Moore) claimed that rules never mattered to the course of
decision”).
57 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 1.01; see also Michael R. Bosse, Standards of Review:
The Meaning of Words, 49 ME. L. REV. 367, 397 (1997) (arguing that “the reasoning behind the
labeling is the important first step in the [standard of review] analysis” and the attempt to base
standards of review on the law/fact distinction “is a misguided and impossible adventure”).
58 EDWARDS & ELLIOTT, supra note 47, at 67.
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standards, but because of its reluctance to disrupt settled expectations and
reveal a split with a coordinate branch. The presumption of patent validity
merely captures this legal practice. And the legal practice behind the words
matters: former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel once told
practitioners that “standards of review influence dispositions in the Federal
Circuit far more than many advocates realize.”59
When the en banc Federal Circuit considered its review of PTO
factfinding in Zurko, it noted that “the outcome of this appeal turns on the
standard of review.”60 This meant that it thought the PTO’s finding was
clearly erroneous (and thus reversible under this standard) but that it was
supported by substantial evidence (and thus not reversible under this lesssearching standard of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)). The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the Federal Circuit had not explained
why PTO review “demands a stricter fact-related review standard than is
applicable to other agencies.”61 The debate was not over the slippery inherent
distinction between “clear error” and “substantial evidence.” Rather, it was
over the meaning behind these words and the balance of power between the
PTO and the Federal Circuit. An empirical study concluded that there was a
statistically significant decrease in the Federal Circuit’s reversal of the PTO in
post-Zurko patent cases,62 suggesting that the decision did impact Federal
Circuit review.
Efforts to quantify the effect of standards of review are challenging
due to selection effects. Simply counting reversals misses those cases that are
settled or not appealed. But one would expect these effects to decrease the
observable impact of the standard of review.63 It is thus noteworthy that there
was an observable effect post-Zurko, and that another empirical study of
Illinois appellate cases found that “application of standards of review that
grant less deference to the lower court’s decision regularly yield lower
affirmance rates.”64 Another study of federal appellate cases found that
“deferential standards of review appear to considerably decrease the
probability of outright reversal” and found “no evidence that judges

Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1415, 1415 (1995)
(quoting Paul Michel in 1994, when he was a Circuit Judge on the Federal Circuit).
59

60 In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d sub nom, Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
61 Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165.

Jeffrey M. Samuels & Linda B. Samuels, The Impact of Dickinson v. Zurko on Federal Circuit
Review of USPTO Board Decisions: An Analytic and Empirical Analysis, 20 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 665, 679-80
(2011) (reviewing all relevant decisions of the Federal Circuit from 1990 to 2009, straddling the
1999 Zurko decision).
63 Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 29 (1984) (arguing that selection effects will cause win rates to be independent of decision
standards (but dependent on the stakes of the parties), and that this model “applies
indistinguishably to trial and appellate disputes”).
62

64 Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial Self-Restraint in the
Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 103 (2009).
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manipulate standards of review.”65 Another study avoided the selection effect
problem by looking at the effect of changing standards of review on
departures from federal sentencing guidelines (because all convicted offenders
must be sentenced) and found that “[c]hanges to standards of review clearly
have an impact on district judges’ sentencing behavior.”66 The authors
concluded that these “results also provide indirect evidence that review
standards constrain circuit courts.”67
To be sure, courts sometimes make mistakes in determining the
correct standard of review,68 and similar deference regimes may be treated
differently in different contexts.69 But for our purposes, all that matters is that
courts do in fact grant deference: the evidence presented in this Section
demonstrates that in some cases, courts place a thumb on the scales toward
the judgment of another decisionmaker, rather than simply making the
decision independently.
C. Deference Mistakes Formally Defined
We are now ready to describe the class of cases and situations with
which this Article is centrally concerned. We are interested in situations in
which, at time t1, court C1 decides a particular legal issue. At time t2, court C2
is confronted by a similar legal issue in a different case, and C1’s opinion is
either binding or persuasive precedent.70 C2 makes a “deference mistake”
when it misunderstands C1’s opinion by mistaking the “deference regime”
under which it was decided.
We use “deference regime” to describe trans-substantive standards of
review, burdens of proof, and standards of evidence. “Clear and convincing
evidence” is a deference regime, as are “abuse of discretion,” “clearly
established federal law,” “preponderance of the evidence,” and “de novo.”
We focus on these trans-substantive standards because their potential to
generate judicial errors—particularly errors that propagate and affect
doctrine—has been overlooked. And we treat them as a class because they

Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Study, 2012
UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). The full effects of deferential review were “complex”; for example,
“findings of fact [were] associated with more manifested ideological disagreement than
discretionary rulings or conclusions of law.” Id.
65

66 Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of
Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 413 (2011).
67 Id. at 431-32.
68 See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 233, 252-75 (2009) (reporting that “in nearly three percent of the factual
sufficiency appeals in Texas, the appellate court was using a disfavored standard of review” and
that a handful of California cases applied de novo review “under questionable circumstances”).
69 Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
679 (2002) (quantifying affirmance rates in various administrative appeals).

C1 and C2 could be any combination of appellate courts, trial courts, administrative
bodies, or other decisionmakers; all that is necessary is that C2 would consider C1’s opinion to
be at least persuasive on the issue.
70
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share many of the same characteristics, including their propensity to be
misunderstood or addressed sloppily by the courts that apply them.
“Deference regime” may not seem like the most appropriate term, as
many of these evidentiary standards do not self-evidently involve deference to
a lower body in the way that an “abuse of discretion” standard might. We
employ the term largely because it is convenient and relatively descriptive.
But we believe that it captures much of what is driving the trans-substantive
standards in these situations. For instance, the fact that a federal court can
only invalidate an issued patent if there is “clear and convincing evidence” is
due to the deference the court affords to the PTO, which issued the patent.71
The fact that a federal court will only overturn a state conviction if it violated
“clearly established federal law” is due to the deference the federal courts owe
to state courts under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).72 Likewise for cases of qualified immunity, where police officers
and other state actors may only be held responsible under § 1983 for
violations of “clearly established” law in part because of the deference owed
by courts to officers whose responsibility it is to enforce the law.73 Although
the precision of the term we employ is not of great importance, we wish to
emphasize the commonalities between these trans-substantive standards, and
thus the sense behind treating them collectively here.
A “deference mistake” occurs when C2 relies on C1’s opinion without
fully accounting for the deference regime under which C1 decided the prior
case, thereby using the precedent in a way C1 may not have intended. That
mistake could be explicit or implicit, and it may or may not be dispositive in a
given case. But if precedent influences judicial decisions, and deference

71 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011) (agreeing with the
Federal Circuit that the statutory presumption of patent validity codified the “common-law
presumption based on ‘the basic proposition that a government agency such as the [PTO] was
presumed to do its job’” (quoting American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007) (noting that the
“rationale underlying the presumption” of patent validity is “that the PTO, in its expertise, has
approved the claim”).
72 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214; see Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (“AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings, and demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Monique Anne
Gaylor, Note, Postcards from the Bench: Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State Court Decisions, 31
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2003) (“Although opinions differ on the practical magnitude of
change in federal habeas review of state petitions wrought by the enactment of the AEDPA, the
statute does mandate a level of federal deference to state court decisions on issues of federal law
previously nonexistent.” (footnote omitted)).
73 See Charles T. Putnam & Charles T. Ferris, Defending a Maligned Defense: The Policy Bases of the
Qualified Immunity Defense in Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 665, 708
(1992) (“As might be expected, the courts appear willing to grant wide deference to the judgment
of correctional officials when those officials are confronted with situations in which the use of force
is perceived as necessary.”); see also Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (D.N.H. 1973) (“This
deference to the judgment of prison officials in perceiving what they consider to be an emergency
situation and unilaterally acting to quell or prevent it has been recognized by the federal judiciary
and reflects a proper understanding of a prison’s need for discipline, safety, and security.”).
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matters, then deference mistakes will have the potential to influence the way
cases are decided and, in the long run, the shape of the law.
D. Why Would Courts Make Deference Mistakes?
Those who believe that deference regimes matter might still be
skeptical of our thesis for another reason: the idea that a court might make a
mistake about the relevant deference regime might seem bizarre. For example,
it is well understood that a right must be “clearly established” to defeat a
claim of qualified immunity, so the very fact that the defendant is a public
official—or that the defendant has made a claim of qualified immunity—
should alert the judge reading the opinion to the fact that what is at issue is
whether the right is clearly established, not whether the right exists.
Yet it is easy to see how such a mistake might be made. A sloppy
judge (or clerk) might not read an opinion in full, or might not attend to all of
the details and circumstances surrounding a holding. A judge (or clerk) might
take a single sentence or paragraph out of context. The availability of legal
materials online, which allows individuals to search electronically for certain
words or phrases or jump to certain portions of an opinion, might facilitate
and exacerbate these types of errors.74 And indeed, courts do make these types
of mistakes, and they do so across a variety of legal doctrines, as we show in
Part II. Even though we cannot quantify the frequency of such mistakes, we
think most readers would agree that courts sometimes cite cases
inappropriately, either intentionally or unintentionally (or both).
Judges may have strategic reasons for citing precedents misleadingly
in some cases. But such mistakes may also occur where judges lack the
resources to carefully consider each of their citations. When judicial caseloads
surge, judges have less time to devote to each case. This can affect substantive
outcomes.75 Deference mistakes are also likely to become more common as
average opinion length increases, giving judges less time to focus on each
citation.76 The average number of cases cited in federal appellate opinions
has increased from around 15 in 1957 to over 30 in 2007, in part due to the
ease of citation production through electronic legal research.77
Judges increasingly rely on law clerks (who are often fresh out of law
school) to perform legal research and to draft opinions (as indicated by textual
analysis,78 statements by judges,79 and even opinions themselves80).
One of us committed such an error while clerking, though the error was fortunately caught
by a co-clerk.
75 See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (2011) (showing that when the
Second and Ninth Circuits were overwhelmed with immigration appeals, they began to overrule
district courts less often than other circuits in non-immigration civil appeals).
76 Cf. Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621 (2008) (examining the increase in Supreme Court opinion
length over time).
74

77 Casey R. Fronk, The Cost of Judicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of Citation Practices in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 51, 70 tbl.1.
78 See Jeffrey S. Rosenthal & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Ghostwriting: Authorship on the Supreme Court,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1307 (2011).
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Nonprecedential cases may be written entirely by staff attorneys and law
clerks with little supervision.81 A law clerk might insert a quotation from some
precedential opinion that supports his or her judge’s argument without
reading the entire opinion or considering its context, and judges might not
verify every citation in their opinions.82 In sum, we believe that there are
many reasons why courts may make deference mistakes. We next bring some
content to this existence claim by documenting instances in which courts have
made such errors; Part III will then explicate our model of deference mistakes
and the way in which they can exert long-term influence on legal doctrine.

II. Deference Mistakes in Practice
Part I showed that the three necessary elements for deference mistakes
are present in the real-world legal system: decisionmakers sometimes grant
deference on issues that matter in future cases in ways that might be
asymmetric; this deference does sometimes affect outcomes; and various
institutional factors might cause courts to rely on precedent without
considering the deference regime under which it was decided. This Part now
demonstrates that deference mistakes have actually occurred in practice, and
that they are a plausible source of some doctrinal movement that has
occurred in these areas of law.
A. Federal Rights Under Qualified Immunity and Habeas: Not
Clearly Established or Clearly Not Established?
Deference mistakes may be most pernicious when courts review issues
of law under different standards. If a criminal defendant raises an issue of
criminal procedure in the course of a criminal trial, the court will decide the
issue according to whatever legal standard is intrinsic to the criminal
procedure right itself. A court must decide whether a search was
“reasonable,” whether a defendant’s waiver of her Fifth Amendment right
79 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 148 (1990) (“[M]ost
judicial opinions are written by the judges’ law clerks rather than by the judges themselves . . . .”);
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 261 (2002) (“After this [post-conference]
discussion, I ask the clerk to prepare a first draft of a Court opinion and to have it for me in ten
days or two weeks.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1383 (1995) (“It is an ill-kept secret that law clerks often do
early drafts of opinions for their judges.”).
80 See, e.g., Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Schafner, 651 F. Supp. 776, 778 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (“This
Memorandum of Opinion was prepared by William G. Somerville, III, Law Clerk, in which the
Court fully concurs.”).
81 See Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish
U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2007); Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 153 (2012).

Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine,
120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1934 (2011) (stating that when federal courts “cite [state] cases that are
outdated from a methodological perspective,” “[t]hese citation choices are likely due to errors by
law clerks or lawyers or to the tendency of courts to rely on the same (sometimes outdated) set of
boilerplate precedents from case to case”).
82
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was “voluntary,” or whether a defendant was denied the right to “confront”
an accuser. These are the baseline legal standards. As described in the
following sections, however, if the same question arises in the context of a
habeas petition or a § 1983 suit for damages, this baseline standard is not the
only one at issue. A court must determine in addition whether the right was
“clearly established”—that is, whether prior cases firmly establish the right, or
whether it represents a step beyond existing law.83 This is a higher standard
and represents a position of deference, either to the state court that originally
tried the defendant (habeas) or to the state actor who is the defendant
(§ 1983).
If a court announces that a certain right was not “clearly established”,
and then courts rely on that precedent in a direct criminal appeal to conclude
that the right does not exist at all, this mistake would tend to shrink the scope
of the right. In other words, if courts regularly mistake a right that is not
“clearly established” for one that is “clearly not established,” the effect will be
to contract the scope and power of that right.84
1. Habeas Relief for Criminal Defendants
The writ of habeas corpus allows a prisoner to challenge the legal
authority for his detention. We focus here on 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows
the writ to be granted when a state prisoner is held “in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”85 Under AEDPA, such
relief is available after a state-court merits adjudication only if the decision
“was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”86
A court considering a habeas petition is thus not determining de novo
whether there was a violation of federal law; rather, the court may only
consider whether there are on-point Supreme Court “holdings, as opposed to
. . . dicta” on the legal issue and whether the state court decision was
“diametrically different”87 from this precedent or involved an “unreasonable”
application of law on which it is not “possible fairminded jurists could
disagree.”88 The Supreme Court has made clear that it is not enough for the
state court to have gotten the law wrong: “an unreasonable application of

We do not mean to imply that “clearly established” has the same meaning in both contexts.
As we will explain in Section III.C, such mistakes could also operate in the opposite
direction: just because some court has held that a right is established does not mean that the right
is “clearly established.” We have not found any examples of such errors, and we think these errors
less likely because the government tends to focus on the importance of the “clearly established”
requirement in cases where it applies, but which kind of mistake dominates is ultimately an
empirical question.
85 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
86 Id. § 2254(d); see generally Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas
Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 535 (1999).
87 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 412 (2000).
88 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
83
84
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federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”89 In
addition to this restricted legal review, a court considering a habeas petition
must also give “remarkably deferential review” to “state court factfindings,
actual or implied.”90
Given this high degree of deference on both law and facts, we would
expect federal courts at all levels to deny habeas relief—finding no “clearly
established” violation of federal law—in many cases where they would have
found a violation on direct review. It would be a mistake to rely on these
habeas precedents when evaluating the existence of these rights on direct
review, and yet numerous courts have done exactly that.
In Harris v. Stovall, the Sixth Circuit considered a habeas petition from
an indigent defendant who argued that due process was violated when he was
denied transcripts from the earlier trial of his codefendants.91 The defendant
had hoped to use these transcripts to impeach the state’s witnesses. The
Supreme Court had held, in Britt v. North Carolina, that “the state must
‘provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.’”92 But
the Sixth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court had not specifically
extended Britt’s principle to the situation in Harris: “Supreme Court precedent
existing at the time of petitioner’s trial did not dictate or compel a rule that a
defendant is entitled to a free copy of a transcript of his codefendants’
previous trial for impeachment of witnesses.”93 Harris was then cited by a
district court in an initial criminal trial in denying a motion for transcripts from
an indigent defendant:
In Harris v. Stovall . . . this Circuit reviewed the limits of the
United States Supreme Court’s directive in Britt. . . . The
Court concluded in Harris that U.S. Supreme Court precedent
did not establish that the defendant was entitled to a free copy
of a transcript of his co-defendants’ previous trial for
impeachment of witnesses.94
But this is a mistake: Harris did not say that “Supreme Court precedent did
not establish” a right to free transcripts of earlier proceedings—it said that
Supreme Court precedent did not clearly establish such a right. The Supreme
Court of Ohio also made a deference mistake involving Harris: in rejecting a
capital defendant’s request for daily transcripts of his trial, the court
erroneously cited Harris as “rejecting defendant’s contention that Britt entitled
him to transcripts from his accomplice’s trial.”95 And a brief by the United
Id. at 785 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 7.02.
91 212 F.3d 940, 941-42 (6th Cir. 2000).
92 Id. at 944 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
93 Id. at 945.
89
90

94 Carrion v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 2d 850, 851-52 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (citing Harris, 212
F.3d 940).
95 State v. Treesh, 739 N.E.2d 749, 770 (Ohio 2001).
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States before the First Circuit similarly erred by citing Harris as “holding an
indigent defendant is not entitled to free copies of transcripts from a codefendant’s trial.”96
In Brown v. Payton,97 the California Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor’s misstatements (that the jury should disregard the defendant’s
religious conversion) did not mislead the jury about its ability to consider
mitigating evidence.98 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the prosecutor
was mistaken, but held that habeas relief was not warranted because the
decision was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.99 Two concurrences disagreed about whether they would have
found an Eighth Amendment violation on direct review; Justice Breyer noted
that “this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to defer to the reasonable
conclusions of state-court judges makes a critical difference.”100 But Payton
was later cited to reject challenges to similar prosecutorial statements in nonhabeas cases. The Arizona Supreme Court stated that in Payton, the Supreme
Court had concluded that “the jury was adequately instructed as to
mitigation,” and that the prosecutor’s comments at issue in the Arizona case
were “[l]ikewise” allowable.101 Payton was also cited by the Second Circuit in
support of the conclusion that “it is extremely unlikely that the jury felt
constrained in its consideration of . . . mitigating evidence” in a case where
“the prosecutor erroneously argued that the jury could not consider
mitigating evidence that was unrelated to the crimes for which he had been
found guilty.”102
In Poole v. Goodno, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a habeas
petition because “[t]here is no clearly established Supreme Court law which
holds that due process requires a jury trial in civil commitment proceedings
or that incorporates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury for such
cases.”103 But in five subsequent cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
mischaracterized this case, repeatedly stating that “the Eighth Circuit has
held that federal due process does not require a jury trial before a person is
committed as [a Sexually Dangerous Person] under Minnesota law.”104 The
96 Brief for Appellee at 50, United States v. Solano-Moreta, No. 09-1067, 2009 WL 7196601,
at *50 (1st Cir. Sept. 2, 2009).
97 544 U.S. 133 (2005).
98 See id. at 138-39.
99 Id. at 147.
100 Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 147-48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101 State v. Roque, 141 P.3d 368, 398 (Ariz. 2006).
102 United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2008).
103 335 F.3d 705, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2003).
104 In re Civil Commitment of Sargent, No. A04-1767, 2005 WL 406345, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2005); see In re Civil Commitment of Shell, No. A08-1043, 2009 WL 1182152, at *8
(Minn. Ct. App. May 5, 2009); In re Civil Commitment of Martin, A04-1634, 2005 WL 354088, a
*5 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005); In re Civil Commitment of Hartleib, No. A04-863, 2004 WL
2283558, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004); see also In re Commitment of McEiver, No. A042002, 2005 WL 704298, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005) (“There is no established law
requiring a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment before a person is committed . . . under
Minnesota law. (citing Poole, 335 F.3d at 710-11)).
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First Circuit also cited Poole as a case where “the claim to a jury trial right in
civil commitments has been rejected.”105
In the habeas appeal Sims v. Rowland, the Ninth Circuit held that “the
state court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing sua sponte when presented
with evidence of juror bias” was not contrary to clearly established federal
law: “The reason is simple: the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
due process requires a trial court to hold a hearing sua sponte whenever
evidence of juror bias comes to light.”106 But in a later direct appeal involving
juror bias, the Ninth Circuit itself erroneously cited Sims as “holding that due
process does not require a trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing sua
sponte when presented with evidence of juror bias.”107
The habeas petition in Anderson v. Mullin raised a double jeopardy
challenge to defendant’s prosecution for a lesser included offense after his
conviction for a greater offense had been reversed based on insufficient
evidence.108 The Tenth Circuit denied the petition based on the Supreme
Court’s “express reservation” of this question in Greene v. Massey.109 But then
the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that “[a]lthough the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled upon this precise issue, at least three federal
appellate courts have determined that it is permissible for a defendant to be
retried for a lesser included offense” in these circumstances—citing Anderson
and two other habeas cases.110 A federal district court similarly stated that
Anderson held that “double jeopardy [is] no bar to prosecution for lesser
included offense” in these circumstances.111 These citations ignore the
deferential context of Anderson: the habeas petition was necessarily rejected
because of the Supreme Court’s express reservation in Greene, but that does
not mean that the Tenth Circuit would not have found a violation on direct
review.
Finally, in Newton v. Kemna, the defendant had sought to disqualify a
witness as incompetent based on drug use, and his habeas petition asserted
that the trial court’s refusal to grant access to the witness’s psychiatric records
violated the Confrontation Clause.112 The Eighth Circuit noted that “the
Supreme Court has recognized in other circumstances that constitutional
rights can trump evidentiary privileges,” but concluded that “[g]iven the
restrictive nature of habeas review,” it was not their “province to speculate as
to whether the Supreme Court, if faced with the issue, would find that
United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2010).
Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
107 United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).
108 327 F.3d 1148, 1150-52 (10th Cir. 2003).
109 Id. at 1155 (citing Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 25 n.7 (1978)).
105
106

110 Cohron v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 489, 498 n.26 (Ky. 2010) (citing Anderson, 327
F.3d at 1154-58; Shute v. Texas, 117 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 1997); Beverly v. Jones, 854 F.2d 412
(11th Cir. 1988)).
111 Hargrove v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:08-CV-00669, 2010 WL 518176, at
*12 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2010).
112 354 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Missouri’s physician-patient privilege must give way to a defendant’s desire to
use psychiatric records in cross-examination.”113 A later district court relied
primarily on Newton in rejecting a party’s request for a witness’s medical
records, erroneously stating that Newton “held that the trial court’s denial of
the criminal defendant’s access to the witness’s medical records did not
violate the confrontation clause under the Sixth Amendment.”114 Another
district court said that a criminal defendant’s request for medical records
“appears to be foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s recent decision in Newton v.
Kemna.”115 And a treatise cites Newton as support for the proposition that
“privilege claims by testifying witnesses should generally be sustained.”116
In sum, these examples illustrate that numerous courts have made
deference mistakes by relying on habeas precedents in cases that arose on
direct review. In the absence of other factors, the cumulative effect of such
mistakes would be a systematic shrinking of federal rights. We would thus
expect a declining success rate for both habeas petitions and direct criminal
appeals.
There is some evidence that the availability of habeas relief is
shrinking, and not only in response to AEDPA’s 1996 enactment.117 There
are many possible explanations for the shrinking availability of habeas relief,
including changing judicial philosophies, and many of these explanations may
be complementary.118 We simply add one more possible explanation: that
deference mistakes—in which courts mistake rights that are not clearly
established for those that are clearly not established—may be contributing to
a systematic doctrinal creep.

113

Id.at 781-82.

Jackson v. Wiersema Charter Serv., Inc., No. 4:08CV00027, 2009 WL 1531815, at *1
(E.D. Mo. June 1, 2009).
114

115

2005).

United States v. Stone, No. CR. 05-30049, 2005 WL 1845153, at *3 (D.S.D. July 29,

116 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:43 &
n.71 (3d ed. 2012).
117 See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 85, 102 tbl.2 (2012) (examining all 115 Supreme Court habeas decisions from 1996 to
2011 and finding that the success rate declined from under 50% in the 1990s to just over 20% in
the 2000s to under 15% in 2010-11); see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 79 (2011)
(“[T]he percentage of petitioners who obtain relief has decreased over time.”).
118 We certainly do not mean to imply that changes to habeas doctrine have been driven
entirely by mechanistic effects that have escaped judicial notice. See, e.g., Hawthorne v.
Schneiderman, 695 F.3d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 2012) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“During the past
several decades, many both inside and outside the courts have called for federal habeas review to
focus on issues that cast doubt upon the prisoner’s guilt, rather than technical errors unrelated to
guilt or innocence. Yet, amidst these calls, the Supreme Court and Congress have shaped habeas
review so that technical errors—typically by prisoners and their counsel—often preclude genuine
inquiry into guilt and innocence.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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2. Qualified Immunity in § 1983 and Bivens Suits
A similar deference regime exists in the qualified immunity context.
Plaintiffs may seek redress for constitutional violations by government officials
under § 1983119 (for state actors) or Bivens120 (for federal officials), but the
doctrine of qualified immunity limits government liability for damages.121
The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”122
Thus, as in the habeas context, courts might evaluate whether federal rights
exist (on direct review), or whether the rights are “clearly established” (in
§ 1983 cases), although the “clearly established” language was judicially
rather than statutorily created.
One might expect a similar problem as in the habeas context: even if
a court thinks there was a constitutional violation, the government will win on
qualified immunity if the violation was not “clearly established.” And if
similar situations arise outside the qualified immunity context—for example,
where a lawsuit seeks an injunction or the suppression of evidence or involves
municipal policy123—and courts mistakenly rely on these qualified immunity
precedents to conclude that there was no violation, the result would be a
systematic shrinking of constitutional rights. In other words, courts might
mistake rights that are not clearly established for ones that are clearly not
established.
But there is an important difference between qualified immunity and
habeas that makes these deference mistakes less likely. In the 2001 decision
Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court mandated a particular sequencing for
qualified immunity cases, holding that courts must first consider whether the
alleged conduct violated a constitutional right before considering whether
that right is clearly established.124 Many criticized Saucier for mandating dicta

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
121 See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 726-42, 947-1006 (6th ed. 2009) (describing Bivens, § 1983,
and qualified immunity).
119
120

122 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002) (earlier cases with “materially similar” facts are not necessary to show that a “clearly
established” right was violated); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 268 (1997) (right may be
established by consistent Courts of Appeals precedent); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987) (right must be established in a “particularized” rather than general sense).
123 See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2036 n.5 (2011) (listing these as situations where
qualified immunity is unavailable).
124 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The Supreme Court had followed this
approach in earlier cases. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (“Since the police action
in this case violated petitioners’ Fourth Amendment right, we now must decide whether this right
was clearly established at the time of the search.”); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 535 (1985)
(“Mitchell is immune from suit for his authorization of the Davidon wiretap notwithstanding that
his actions violated the Fourth Amendment.”).
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about important constitutional questions,125 but others argued that the
benefits of constitutional articulation outweighed these concerns.126 In 2009,
the Supreme Court abrogated mandatory Saucier sequencing in Pearson v.
Callahan,127 but the Court has emphasized that sequencing “is sometimes
beneficial to clarify the legal standards governing public officials.”128 And
post-Pearson studies have found that when courts concluded that qualified
immunity applied, only around twenty-five to thirty percent of circuit cases
and fewer than five percent of district cases exercised their discretion to avoid
the underlying constitutional issue.129
A formal deference mistake (as we have defined it) requires precedent
that finds immunity without reaching the constitutional question, and given
the small universe of such cases, it is unsurprising that we found fewer
examples of such mistakes than in the habeas context. But that is not to say
that no such examples exist.
For example, in DiMeglio v. Haines, a zoning inspector alleged that the
zoning commissioner violated his First Amendment rights by reassigning him
in retaliation for his speech at a public meeting.130 The Fourth Circuit held
that the zoning commissioner was protected by qualified immunity: it was not
clearly established that the inspector’s speech was protected because he was
speaking as an employee.131 The court noted that shortly before the events
here, “the Fifth Circuit [in Terrell] actually had held that whether speech is
protected . . . depends upon whether the employee is speaking as an
employee or as an interested citizen,” and that it was thus “at least
questionable” whether the speech was protected.132 A district court within the
Fourth Circuit then cited DiMeglio in support of its rejection of a First
Amendment claim, stating that “the critical determination is ‘whether the
speech at issue . . . was made primarily in the plaintiff’s role as citizen or
primarily in [her] role as employee.’”133 But the language quoted is from
125 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring); Pierre
N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1275-81 (2006).
126 See, e.g., Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401 (2009); Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in
Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539 (2007); cf. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of
Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115 (2009) (arguing that the Pearson rule is
defensible in certain contexts).
127 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
128 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011).
129 See Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 623, 629 & tbl.2 (2011) (examining 190 circuit cases from 2009 to 2010 and finding that
31.4% of denied claims avoided the constitutional question); Colin Rolfs, Comment, Qualified
Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 489, 496-497 & tbls.1-2 (2011)
(examining 100 district cases and 100 circuit cases from 2009 and finding that of denied claims,
24.6% of circuit decisions and 2.7% of district decisions avoided the constitutional question).
130 45 F.3d 790, 794 (4th Cir. 1999).
131 Id. at 805.
132 Id. at 805-06 (citing Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1986)).
133 Jackson v. Alleghany County, No. 7:07CV0417, 2008 WL 3992351 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28,
2008) (quoting DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 805).
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Terrell, the Fifth Circuit case cited to show that the right was not clearly
established—DiMeglio was not adopting Terrell’s holding.
Given the smaller number of deference mistakes in the qualified
immunity context than in the habeas context, one might conclude that
habeas courts should similarly be encouraged to determine whether a right is
established before deciding whether it is clearly established. One scholar has
even argued that mandatory Saucier-type sequencing should be required in
habeas cases as a benefit to future criminal defendants.134 There is, however,
a vigorous empirical debate over whether Saucier actually led to an expansion
in constitutional rights, with some evidence demonstrating that when courts
were forced to reach constitutional issues, they almost always decided these
issues in the defendants’ favor.135 Professor Nancy Leong, who conducted one
of these studies, argues that “[t]he act of recognizing a right, yet precluding a
remedy, could create cognitive dissonance for many judges,” and “[r]ather
than tolerate this cognitive dissonance, judges may be subconsciously inclined
to deny that a constitutional violation occurred at all.”136
The empirical debate over Saucier illustrates that while requiring
courts to be explicit about how they would have decided an issue without
deference may reduce the risk of formal legal error, it could also worsen the
underlying deference problem. If a decisionmakers engage in motivated
reasoning to align their non-deferential conclusions with their deferential
ones, then these (erroneous) non-deferential conclusions will become formally
enshrined in the caselaw.
The risk of technical errors would also be reduced by eliminating the
heightened deference regime, such that the inquiry in habeas and § 1983
cases were simply whether a right exists. But this solution also seems likely to
134 Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009). But see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 39192 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for announcing rules that are
unnecessary to resolve the case “which is governed by the deferential standard of review set forth
in” AEDPA).
135 Compare Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36
PEPP. L. REV. 667, 690 (2009) [hereinafter Leong, Saucier Experiment] (finding “virtually no
change in the percentage of cases where courts held that a constitutional violation had taken place
and a striking increase in the percentage of cases where courts held that no constitutional violation
had taken place”), Rolfs, supra note 129, at 486 n.130 (finding “a lopsided increase in the
frequency with which courts find that no right was violated”), and Sampsell-Jones & Yauch, supra
note 129, at 639 (finding that “the constitutional questions avoided pre-Saucier are now almost
uniformly decided in defendants’ favor”), with Hughes, supra note 126, at 422 tbl.1 (reporting a
post-Saucier increase in cases announcing constitutional rights), and Greg Sobolski & Matt
Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of
Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 547-49 (2010) (reporting a not-statistically-significant
increase in rights-restricting holdings post-Saucier and a statistically significant increase in rightsaffirming holdings). Nancy Leong has argued that the differences between her study, the Hughes
study, and the Sobolski-Steinberg study stem from her inclusion of nonprecedential cases and
multiple claims, as well as the different time periods of the studies. See Nancy Leong, Rethinking the
Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Reply to John Jeffries, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 969, 972 n.32 (2011).
136 Leong, Saucier Experiment, supra note 135, at 704. But see Jeffries, supra note 126, at 125
(arguing that cognitive dissonance does not apply in this context because judges are not making
unconstrained choices).
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make the deference problem worse. As explained in Section I.B, formal
deference regimes typically reflect underlying functional considerations. Even
without the “clearly established” language, courts may be reluctant to require
the government to pay money damages in a § 1983 case, or to contradict a
state court by granting a habeas petition, unless there was clear notice of the
unlawfulness of the state’s conduct. In other words, courts might reach similar
outcomes for substantive reasons irrespective of the formal deference regime.
Without the “clearly established” language to serve as a flag, future courts
would be at even greater risk of making deference mistakes by applying
habeas or § 1983 precedents in direct appeals.
In Part IV, we will return to this issue of how the deference mistakes
problem is best addressed, but first we provide a few more examples of
deference mistakes in other contexts.
B. Criminal Law and Procedure
Mistakes between the different contexts of direct criminal appeals and
habeas and qualified immunity cases are particularly striking, but mistakes
can also occur wholly within the context of direct appeals. Many issues in
criminal cases are reviewed under deferential standards, and later courts
(both district and appellate) sometimes fail to account for a precedent’s
deference regime.
When a party to a criminal case appeals an issue that was raised at
trial, the appellate court typically considers that issue under one of several
deferential standards. Criminal procedure questions, including evidentiary
determinations, challenges for cause, jury instructions, and motions for a new
trial, are reviewed under a deferential “abuse of discretion” standard.137
Others issues are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, including
questions of the defendant’s competency and the voluntariness of waivers.138
Appeals of guilty verdicts based on insufficient evidence are reviewed
according to “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.”139 However, when the appealing party
has failed to raise and preserve the issue at trial, all of these types of questions
are reviewed only for “plain error,” an even more deferential standard.140
Unlike the habeas and qualified immunity deference regimes, in
which the deference formally favors the state, deferential standards of review
such as “plain error” could involve deference to either party in a criminal
appeal. But in practice, the deference usually favors the state, as most
criminal appeals are brought by criminal defendants who lost below.
Defendants appeal convictions but prosecutors generally cannot appeal when
137

2012).

See 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE

ET AL.,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 27.5(e) (3d ed. 2000 & Supp.

See id.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
140 See id. § 27.5(d).
138
139
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the defendant prevails,141 and defendants appeal sentences much more
frequently than prosecutors do.142 Appellate criminal caselaw will thus appear
more government-friendly than the appellate court may have intended. This
one-sided appeal problem will compound the deference mistakes in the
habeas and qualified immunity contexts discussed above: in addition to
mistaking the “clearly established” standard, subsequent courts may not fully
account for an appellate court’s deferential standard of review, which most
commonly favors the government’s position.143
Below we provide examples of two kinds of deference mistakes that
have occurred in criminal cases: (1) relying on precedents holding that an
error did not rise to the level of “plain error” to reject claims of error when
this high level of deference is inappropriate, and (2) relying on precedents
holding that an evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discretion when the
same issue later arises in a non-deferential posture. We then conclude this
section by examining the role of deference mistakes in the overall doctrinal
development of criminal law and procedure.
1. Plain Error Mistakes
Even those who accept that deference regimes sometimes matter
might be skeptical that courts would ever distinguish between different
deference regimes, rather than lumping different standards such as “abuse of
discretion” and “plain error” under one mental category of “deference.” We
agree that the labels for these deference regimes have little intrinsic meaning,
but we think they reflect the way judges generally treat the different situations
in which they apply. When a criminal defendant fails to object at trial so that
a district court judge has no warning of a potential problem, appellate judges
141 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795-97 (1969). A
judgment for the defendant entered on legal grounds—rather than based on a jury verdict or on
the insufficiency of the evidence—may be appealed when a reversal would not require a second
trial. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 & n.7 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 345 (1975). Prosecutors may also appeal pre-trial suppressions of evidence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (2012).
142 For example, the federal courts of appeals decided 5,844 sentencing appeals from federal
criminal defendants in 2011, compared with fifty-three sentencing appeals from the government.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbls.56-56A (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and
_Sourcebooks/2011/SBTOC11.htm.

In habeas appeals, the government will necessarily have won below. And qualified
immunity appeals may be more likely to be cases in which the government won below for two
reasons. First, a denial of qualified immunity may only be appealed when it involves a question of
law (whereas grants of qualified immunity may always be appealed). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 671-74 (2009) (summarizing the law); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)
("[W]e hold that a district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it
turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ . . . .”). Second, the government—as a
repeat player in qualified immunity cases—may also be more likely to settle cases that are likely to
result in unfavorable appellate precedent. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 102 (1974) (“[W]e would
expect the body of ‘precedent’ cases—that is, cases capable of influencing the outcome of future
cases—to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to [repeat players.”).
143

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

26

may be exceedingly reluctant to undo the hard work of their colleague. This
hesitance may well surpass whatever caution an appellate judge would
exercise before overturning a lower court decision reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Problems can arise, however, if in one case the defendant doesn’t
object at trial and the court of appeals affirms on plain error review, and then
in subsequent cases—in which defendants do object at trial—that precedent
is used mistakenly by district or appellate courts to find against the
defendants.
For example, in United States v. Ristine, the Eighth Circuit held that it
was not plain error to prohibit the defendant from “possessing ‘any
pornographic materials’” or entering “‘any establishment’ where
pornography or erotica can be obtained” as a condition of supervised release
from imprisonment, despite precedent from another circuit suggesting that
such a condition raises First Amendment concerns.144 The court explicitly
highlighted the highly deferential standard of review:
Were we reviewing this special condition for an abuse of
discretion, we might be forced to select the line of reasoning
we find more compelling, but the standard here is plain error.
. . . [W]e cannot conclude that the District Court committed
an error that is clear under current law because . . . the current
law concerning this issue is unsettled. Because the imposition
of the condition was not plain error, we are bound to uphold
it.145
Although it would be a deference mistake to rely on Ristine to find that similar
conditions on supervised release are not an abuse of discretion, a later Eighth
Circuit panel did exactly that. The court found that a ban on entering any
location where pornography could be obtained was not an abuse of discretion
because the restriction was “virtually identical to wording [the Eighth Circuit]
previously upheld” in Ristine.146 Similarly, Ristine held that conditions
prohibiting the defendant from owning a camera and restricting his computer
usage did not constitute plain error,147 and subsequent Eighth Circuit cases
explicitly relied on Ristine to affirm similar restrictions where the defendant
did preserve his objection below.148
As another example, deference mistakes have also resulted from the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hernandez, which rejected a
defendant’s procedural challenge to his sentence based on the district court’s

144
145

335 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 695.

United States v. Mefford, 711 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Ristine, 335 F.3d at
694-95).
147 Ristine, 335 F.3d at 695-96.
148 See United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 481 (8th Cir. 2010) (“We have previously upheld
the imposition of [conditions including a ban on owning a camera] . . . .” (citing Ristine, 335 F.3d
at 696)); United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A restriction on computer
usage does not constitute an abuse of discretion . . . .” (citing Ristine, 335 F.3d at 696)).
146
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failure to provide an adequate individualized assessment.149 The court noted
that while “the district court in this case might have said more,” the
defendant had “lodged no objection to the adequacy of the district court’s
explanation,” and he “has simply not demonstrated that the district court’s
explanation constituted plain error.”150 It thus would be a mistake to rely on
Hernandez when reviewing a sentence under a more stringent standard. The
Fourth Circuit itself recognized as much in a later nonprecedential case,
rejecting the government’s reliance on Hernandez—even though “the district
court’s reasoning in Hernandez was essentially identical to the district court’s
reasoning in this case”— because the review was not for plain error.151
And yet numerous other Fourth Circuit cases have erroneously relied
on Hernandez while affirming sentences under the less deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard. One case cited Hernandez as “finding no procedural
error” under similar circumstances and affirmed a sentence even though “it
would have been preferable for the district court to have specifically
mentioned” certain sentence-related factors.152 Another panel wrote, “[T]he
district court’s explanation was more than sufficient. See Hernandez . . . ,” with
no mention of the differing standard of review.153 Numerous other abuse-ofdiscretion cases have made the same mistake.154 Hernandez also has little
applicability for district courts imposing sentences in the first instance, but a
district court relied on Hernandez as having found “the district court’s ‘sparse
explanation’ legally sufficient,”155 with no mention of the highly deferential
standard of review or Hernandez’s hint that “the district court . . . might have
said more.”156
2. Pro-Prosecutor Evidentiary Determinations
Deference mistakes in criminal cases do not require confusion
between two different standards of review, such as plain error and abuse of
discretion. They also arise in cases that are reviewed under a single standard
when district courts mistake deferential appellate precedents for more binding
guidance. For example, as we have noted, just because an evidentiary holding
603 F.3d 267, 271-73 (4th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 272-73.
151 United States v. Jackson, 397 F. App’x 924, 926 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
152 United States v. Bennett, 439 F. App’x 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
153 United States v. Hood, 487 F. App’x 69, 70 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
154 E.g., United States v. Messer, No. 13-4379, 2013 WL 5977339, at *2 (4th Cir. Nov. 12,
2013) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court’s explanation, while brief, was legally adequate . . . .”
(citing Hernandez)); United States v. Buczkowski, 505 F. App’x 236, 238-39 (4th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“The court’s explanation of the within-Guideline sentence may not have been lengthy,
but it was sufficient.” (citing Hernandez)); United States v. Garner, 489 F. App’x 721, 722 (4th Cir.
2012) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court provided an adequate explanation . . . .” (citing
Hernandez)); United States v. Clemons, 412 F. App’x 646, 649 (4th Cir. 2011) (relying on Hernandez
as holding that the “sentence [was] not procedurally unreasonable”).
149
150

155

2011).
156

Pierce v. United States, No. 11-C-0781, 2011 WL 3881019, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 2,
Hernandez, 603 F.3d at 272.
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is not an abuse of discretion does not mean that the contrary holding would
not also be allowed. If litigants are more likely to appeal rulings admitting a
certain type of evidence than excluding it, appellate caselaw would be skewed
toward deferential affirmances (and reversals) of those admissions.
Subsequent courts might then be biased toward admitting this evidence. And
while a shift toward admitting more evidence might not systematically favor
either criminal defendants or prosecutors—after all, each side often has
evidence to present—certain kinds of evidence might be more likely to be
offered by one side.
As one such example, in a sample of twenty-five appellate cases
discussing the admission or exclusion of latent fingerprint evidence, twentyfour were cases in which the defendant had appealed and the appellate court
affirmed the admission of fingerprint evidence against the defendant.157 In
every case, the appellate court reviewed the lower court’s decision only for
abuse of discretion. There are significant questions about the scientific
reliability of fingerprint evidence, as summarized by the 2009 forensic science
report from the National Academy of Sciences.158 But a district court faced
with this one-sided body of appellate fingerprint precedent might erroneously
conclude that it has no discretion to exclude such evidence.
For example, in United States v. Cerna, the district court stated that a
method of latent fingerprint identification “specifically has undergone Daubert
analysis by a number of courts and has been repeatedly upheld as sufficiently
reliable.”159 But the three cases cited had only held that admitting such
evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The first specifically acknowledged
shortcomings in the method but concluded that “[t]he district court did not
abuse its discretion.”160 The second explicitly held that abuse-of-discretion
review was appropriate even where the district court made no findings of
fact.161 And the third was very clear about the deferential standard of review:
“Our task is not to determine the admissibility or inadmissibility of fingerprint
analysis for all cases but merely to decide whether, on this record, the district
judge in this case made a permissible choice in exercising her discretion to
157 A Westlaw search on February 5, 2013 for [ latent /s fingerprint /s (admi! exclu!) ] located
25 precedential federal appellate cases discussing the admissibility of latent fingerprint evidence,
and in 24 out of 25, the criminal defendant had appealed and the appellate court affirmed the
admission of finger print evidence against the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365
F.3d 215, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding the
government’s [latent fingerprint] evidence admissible.”). In the remaining case, the government
sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court to admit fingerprint evidence, which the
court of appeals granted. See In re United States, 614 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2010). The district court
had excluded the evidence because of concerns about government tampering, not concerns about
reliability, and the court of appeals reassigned the case because of the district judge’s
“unreasonable fury toward the prosecutors.” Id. at 664-66.
158 NATL’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 8 & n.7, 139-45 (2009); see also Robert
Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
605 (2002).
159 No. CR 08-0730, 2010 WL 3448528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010).
160 United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 110-111 (1st Cir. 2009).
161 Mitchell, 365 F.3d at 233.
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admit the expert testimony.”162 It is a mistake to conclude from these
deferential precedents that fingerprint evidence clearly should be admitted,
but the Cerna court seemed to do exactly that.
Deference mistakes can also arise from deferential affirmances of
decisions to exclude evidence. In United States v. Frazier, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to exclude a forensic investigator’s
testimony on behalf of the defendant.163 The Eleventh Circuit did not state
that allowing the expert to testify would have been an abuse of discretion; to
the contrary, it stressed “the basic principle that an appellate court must
afford the district court’s gatekeeping determinations ‘the deference that is the
hallmark of abuse-of-discretion review.’”164 When discussing “the central
issue” of whether the reliability of the testimony had been established, the
Eleventh Circuit “reiterate[d] that the district court has the same broad
discretion in deciding how to assess the reliability of expert testimony that it
has in its ultimate reliability determination.”165
Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s explicit explanation of the role of
deference in its decision, a subsequent district court managed to misread its
opinion. Wrote this district court in a case decided two years later, “The
Eleventh Circuit held that, although the witness was qualified as an expert in
forensic investigations, he had not offered a reliable foundation.”166 And
another district court rejected a defense expert’s testimony that it found to be
“similar to the expert testimony that the Eleventh Circuit decided was
properly excluded in United States v. Frazier.”167
3. Deference Mistakes and Doctrinal Development
We have given some examples of actual deference mistakes in the area
of criminal law and procedure, but determining the net effect of such mistakes
on doctrine is far more complicated, and is ripe for empirical study.168 In
some cases, courts have explicitly distinguished precedents based on differing

United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 989 (10th Cir. 2009).
387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
164 Id. at 1248 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997)).
165 Id. at 1264.
166 Landrin v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. 05-21145, 2006 WL 5249735, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5,
2006); see also R.K. v. Kanaskie, No. 02-61534, 2007 WL 2026388, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2007)
(making a similar assertion).
162
163

167 United States v. Certantes-Perez, No. EP-12-CR-217, 2012 WL 6155914, at *6 (W.D.
Tex. Dec. 11, 2012).
168 Designing such studies is difficult, in large part because of the difficulty identifying
deference mistakes, as discussed in the following section on employment discrimination. We think
the best approach may be to begin with an area of doctrine that may plausibly have shifted due to
deference mistakes and then to have someone with substantive expertise in the area trace out the
development of that doctrine to see whether any of the significant cases seem attributable to the
problem we identify.
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standards of review.169 In others, the effect of precedents’ deference regimes
on the outcome may be far subtler.
The cases described above are clear examples of deference mistakes
because the subsequent courts appear to have honestly mistaken deferential
precedents as binding. But even where a district court understands the
deference regime of each precedent and makes no formal legal error, we
would still classify it as a “deference mistake” if the court reaches a different
conclusion than it otherwise would due to risk-aversion and uncertainty about
the appellate court’s true position. For example, a district court might survey
the appellate caselaw on fingerprint evidence and conclude, “I don’t think
this evidence is sufficiently reliable, and maybe the court of appeals would
agree, but I’ll admit it anyway because I know that is within my discretion
and I don’t know if I would get reversed for excluding it.” These strategic
deference mistakes may be even more pernicious than honest deference
mistakes in that they are harder to detect, but are just as likely to skew
doctrine for reasons that have little to do with normatively outcomes (such as
who appeals more often). We will explain that point further in the next Part.
Of course, the effect of deference mistakes on doctrinal development
may be overwhelmed by other systematic factors. For example, a number of
commentators have suggested that the asymmetry in criminal appeals will
cause trial judges to favor defendants to avoid reversal.170 This effect might be
outweighed by a competing desire to “preserve reviewability,”171 although
Professor Kate Stith has argued that this pro-prosecution bias is generally
implausible, and she has presented a number of other mechanisms by which
the asymmetry in appeals may systematically push doctrine in a prodefendant direction.172
Stith briefly notes, however, that a contrary pro-prosecution effect
could result from appellate deference, through a mechanism similar to the
one we propose. As she explains, “deference toward the legal evaluations of
the trial court” could result in “a tendency to affirm” convictions, and “[i]f

169 See, e.g., Collins v. Alco Parking Corp., 448 F.3d 652, 658 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Aguilera, 106 F. App’x 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2004); Marshall v. United States, 436 F.2d 155, 157 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Hunter, 2012 S.D. 37, ¶ 19, 814 N.W.2d 413,
418; State v. Reed, 21 S.W.3d 44, 46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). But see United States v. Shelton, 937
F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that a precedent was “not
controlling because it was decided under a different standard of review,” and choosing to treat the
precedent as “controlling” anyway).
170 See, e.g., Justin Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486, 511 (1927);
Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to
Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 38 (1990).
171 Mirjan Damas̆ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 520 n.22 (1973); see OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND
GOVERNMENT APPEALS OF ACQUITTALS 64 (1987) (arguing that allowing government appeals “of
jury instructions might at times work in the defendant’s favor” by eliminating the incentive to “not
frame questionable jury instructions that would favor the defendant, since judges know that the
government cannot appeal instruction on the ground of legal error after an acquittal”).
172 Stith, supra note 170, at 15-42.
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observers (including the trial court) do not recognize and adjust for any such
tendency, they will infer from appellate decisions a constitutional standard
below the original standard.”173 Such mistakes could then propagate: “If the
appellate court defers in each successive round of appeals, the apparent
precedential standard of law could continually shift in a pro-government
direction, absent countervailing bias or correction . . . .”174 Other
commentators have similarly argued that the asymmetry in appeals results in
a one-sided body of precedent, causing pro-government doctrinal shift.175
This pro-prosecution deference effect is independent from the other
sources of bias Stith describes, and all of these effects could be concurrently
pushing doctrine in different directions. Although Stith finds the sources of
pro-defendant bias more plausible, we see no a priori reason to conclude that
one of these effects dominates the development of criminal law—indeed, all
of these effects might be swamped by the shifting political views of the
judiciary.176 As Stith acknowledges, “we need further empirical research on
the extent of pro-defendant—or pro-government—bias resulting from the
present asymmetry in criminal appeal rights.”177 But even if this is true, and
the effects of deference mistakes are mitigated or even overwhelmed by other
trends within the law, that does not mean that deference mistakes are
unimportant. They will exert influence, even if that influence is not the sole or
primary driver of doctrinal development.
C. Employment Discrimination
The opposite asymmetry in appeals may be responsible for a prodefendant shift in employment discrimination law, including cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.178 Unlike in criminal law,
there is no legal barrier to appeals from either side, but empirical work has
shown that in practice, plaintiffs file the vast majority of federal employment
discrimination appeals.179 This asymmetry exists because most summary
173
174

Id. at 27-28 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 28.

175 See Adam Harris Kurland, Court’s in Session: A Law Professor Returns to the Majestic Chaos of a
Criminal Jury Trial, 52 HOW. L.J. 357, 369-70 (2009); Anne Bowen Poulin, Government Appeals in
Criminal Cases: The Myth of Asymmetry, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8 n.15 (2008).
176 Cf. Martin Bonventre & Amanda Hiller, Public Law at the New York Court of Appeals: An
Update on Developments, 2000, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1355, 1382-83 (2001) (describing how pro-defendant
outcomes at New York’s highest court fluctuated with political changes); Cornell W. Clayton & J.
Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s
Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1423 (2006) (“[T]he Burger and Rehnquist Courts
. . . demonstrate a clear and unmistakable shift from a liberal, pro-defendant position prior to
1968 to a conservative, pro-state position after 1968.”).
177 Stith, supra note 170, at 55.
178 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2012)).
179 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal
Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 109 (2009) (reporting that from 1988 to
2004, “plaintiffs’ appeals . . . are ten times more frequent in absolute numbers than defendants’
appeals”).
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judgment motions are made by defendants.180 Plaintiffs, who have the burden
of establishing factually intensive issues such as intent, can rarely succeed on
summary judgment.181 If the defendant’s summary judgment motion is
denied, the defendant cannot appeal,182 and the case often settles before
trial.183 Thus, most employment discrimination appeals are by plaintiffs after
the district court has ruled for the defendant on summary judgment.184
In a recent essay, Judge Nancy Gertner argues that this asymmetry
has led to shifts in substantive discrimination law.185 She notes that even
though the standard of review for summary judgment orders is formally de
novo, appellate courts generally defer to district court judgments in
employment discrimination cases because “[i]t takes substantial work, not to
mention a motivated decisionmaker, to dig into the voluminous summary
judgment record and find a contested issue of fact,” and “few appellate court
judges are so motivated in this area.”186
Indeed, only about ten percent of district court judgments for
defendants in employment discrimination cases are reversed on appeal.187 As
“[t]he body of precedent detailing plaintiffs’ losses grows,” future
“[a]dvocates seeking authority for their positions will necessarily find many
more published opinions in which courts granted summary judgment for the
employer than for the employee.”188 This dynamic, Judge Gertner argues,
has caused judges to develop rules “that have effectively gutted Title VII.”189
Other commentators have noticed a similar pro-defendant trend in
employment discrimination doctrine.190

180 See Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael
Baylson, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Pa. 4 tbl.1 (Nov. 2, 2007),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf (noting that plaintiffs
file only eight to nine percent of summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases).
181 See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 113 (2012) (“Plaintiffs rarely
move for summary judgment. They bear the burden of proving all elements of the claim,
particularly intent, and must do so based on undisputed facts. Defendants need only show
contested facts in their favor on one element of a plaintiff's claim.” (footnotes omitted)).
182 Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891 (2011) (“Ordinarily, orders denying summary
judgment do not qualify as ‘final decisions’ subject to appeal.”).
183 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Cases Fare in
Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440 (2004) (“[A]lmost 70 percent of employment
discrimination and other cases are terminated by settlement.”).
184 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 179, at 109 display 2.
185 Gertner, supra note 181.
186 Id. at 114.
187 See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 179, at 109 display 2.
188 Gertner, supra note 181, at 115.
189 Id. at 123.
190 See, e.g., Lee Reeves, Ragmatism over Politics: Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 482 & n.1 (2008) (citing scholars who have
addressed the “judiciary’s decreasing receptivity to employment discrimination claims”); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 168 (2011)
(discussing the “movement of the judiciary toward foreclosing employment discrimination
plaintiffs’ cases”).
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Our model of deference mistakes makes explicit what is perhaps
implicit in Judge Gertner’s argument: a specific explanation of precisely how
the problem of asymmetric employment discrimination precedent can lead to
substantive doctrinal shifts. If appellate courts generally defer to prodefendant district court judgments in employment discrimination appeals,
future litigants and courts might rely on these precedents without
appreciating the underlying deference regime—and these deference mistakes
will lead to a pro-defendant doctrinal shift.
Employment discrimination is thus an area in which someone who
has closely studied the development of doctrine believes that deference
mistakes have had an appreciable impact. But note that the relevant
deference regime is informal: Judge Gertner argues that the problem arises
from appellate courts’ tendency to defer to district courts that find for
employers on summary judgment, even though the formal standard of review
is de novo. This example illustrates that eliminating formal legal errors will
not solve the deference mistake problem—and it may serve as a cautionary
tale for those who would eliminate formal deference regimes, such as the
presumption of patent validity discussed in the following section.
D. Patent and Trademark Inflation
When the PTO grants a patent or registers a trademark, those
intellectual property rights are entitled to presumptions of validity. A granted
patent may only be invalidated by meeting the higher evidentiary burden of
clear and convincing evidence (rather than a preponderance of the
evidence).191 Similarly, a registered trademark is entitled to a presumption
that it is protectable—that it is either inherently distinctive (such that
consumers are unlikely to view it as merely descriptive) or that it has
secondary meaning (such that consumers in fact view it primarily as
designating a particular source of goods or services).192 Judicial evaluations of
granted patents and trademarks thus involve some deference to the PTO’s
validity determinations, and this deference might cause a court to hold
patents valid or trademarks protectable even though the court would have
refused to recognize an intellectual property right without these evidentiary
presumptions.
It would thus be a mistake for the PTO or courts considering new
applications for patents or trademarks (or reevaluating patents during
reexamination) to rely on precedents from the infringement context in which
granted patents and trademarks were held valid.193 Just because there is not
191

(2011).

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243

See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2012) (stating that registration “shall be prima facie evidence of
the validity of the registered mark”). Note that while U.S. patent rights exist only when the PTO
has granted a patent application, U.S. trademark rights stem from use of the mark—registration
merely results in some legal advantages, such as the presumption of validity. See 3 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 19:1.25, 19:9 (4th ed.
1994 & Supp. 2012).
193 See Ouellette, supra note 9, at 368-71.
192
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clear and convincing evidence that a patent is invalid does not mean that a
similar patent application should not be denied under the lower
preponderance standard that operates in the examination context.194 As we
will explain in more detail in Part III, the cumulative effect of these mistakes
would tend to be an expansion in the boundaries of patentability and of what
kinds of marks are inherently distinctive—an effect commentators have
observed in both the patent195 and the trademark196 contexts.
These mistakes could also occur in the opposite direction: it would be
a mistake to rely on precedents rejecting applications for new patents or
trademarks in order to invalidate granted patents or trademarks—and these
errors would tend to contract the boundaries of patentability and of inherent
distinctiveness. Although these “reverse mistakes” are more plausible than in
the habeas context,197 we suspect that they are still relatively less frequent,
both because there are more precedents involving granted patents and
trademarks to be erroneously applied and because the PTO has the chance to
erroneously rely on these precedents when granting hundreds of thousands of
patents and trademark registrations each year. (Of course, both of these
effects might be swamped by other doctrinal pressures, including other kinds
of deference mistakes.198)
Despite the error inherent to relying on cases out of context, courts199
and the PTO200 regularly cite cases from one context to the other without
194 See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[P]atentability is determined on
the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence . . . .”); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Because it is the only standard of proof lower than clear and convincing,
preponderance of the evidence is the standard that must be met by the PTO in making rejections
. . . .”).
195 See generally Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 473 & n.6 (2011) (citing
sources).
196 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti
Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 264 (2009) (“The decision to recognize colors alone as
protectable, defensible trademarks is an iconic example of reflexive expansion of trademark rights
by members of the judiciary.”); Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Problem with Intellectual Property
Rights: Subject Matter Expansion, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 36, 69 (2011) (“The scope of what can be a
trademark today has expanded [by courts] beyond the typical word, phrase, or unique design that
comprises most trademarks.”); Joseph Cockman, Running from the Runway: Trade Dress Protection in an
Age of Lifestyle Marketing, 89 IOWA L. REV. 671, 690 (2004) (describing “the judicial expansion of
trade dress protection”); Alexandra J. Roberts, A Speech-Act Theory of Distinctiveness 3 (Sept.
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (arguing that under recent trademark decisions, “the concept of
‘mere descriptiveness’ shrinks to near disappearance”).
197 See supra note 84.

For example, patent law is similar to the employment discrimination context discussed
above in that defendants are likely to settle if they do not win on summary judgment, making
patent plaintiffs more likely to appeal. This may push the law in a defendant-friendly direction.
198

199 See, e.g., In re Vaidyanathan, 381 F. App’x 985, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Perfect Web
Techs. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 835
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 105051 (1988)).
200 See, e.g., Ex parte Kim, No. 2009-010047, 2010 WL 3827134, at *2-4 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28,
2010) (reversing an obviousness rejection, and relying in part on the Federal Circuit’s affirmance
of a district court nonobviousness finding in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 536 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2008)); Ex parte Albritton, No. 2008-5023, 2009 WL 671577, at *16 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 13,
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considering whether this is appropriate in light of the different evidentiary
standards. For example, in Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., the Federal Circuit
concluded that the evidence did not meet the clear-and-convincing hurdle for
invalidity, despite a “simple” meat-encasing invention that appeared obvious
under the district court’s “common sense” view, where the patentee presented
evidence such as initial skepticism by experts followed by commercial
success.201 Mintz arguably made it more difficult to invalidate patents for
obviousness in the context of a suit for infringement,202 but the meat-encasing
invention at issue may well have been obvious under the preponderance
standard of a PTO proceeding, so Mintz should have limited precedential
value in that context. And yet the Patent Trial and Appeal Board within the
PTO has repeatedly cited Mintz when reversing examiner rejections of
patents for obviousness.203
Deference mistakes also may be responsible for an expansion in the
kinds of claims that pass the “definiteness” requirement for patentability,204
under which claims must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the
invention.205 Whether a claim is invalid for indefiniteness is a pure question of
law, but the Federal Circuit has held that to “accord respect to the statutory
presumption of patent validity,” it will find granted claims indefinite “only if
reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile” and the claim is
“insolubly ambiguous.”206 But this high barrier to invalidating a patent for
indefiniteness has at times been improperly imported into the examination
context, as illustrated by decisions of the reviewing board within the PTO.207
Even after the PTO explicitly clarified that examiners should use “a lower
threshold of ambiguity” such that claims are indefinite if “amenable to two or
2009) (reversing an obviousness rejection in a “close case” based on Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew
Tackie, Inc., 119 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
201 679 F.3d 1372, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
See Jason Rantanen, Mintz v. Dietz & Watson: Hindsight and Common Sense, PATENTLY-O
(May 30, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/mintz-v-dietz-watson-hindsight-andcommon-sense.html.
202

See Switech Medical AG Requester & Respondent v. Sanuwave, Inc., 2013 WL 4636443,
at *6 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 28, 2013); Ex parte Werner Montabaur, 2013 WL 5273983, at *3 (P.T.A.B.
June 6, 2013); Ex parte Kueppers, 2012 WL 6772030, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2012).
204 Cf. Christa J. Laser, A Definite Claim on Claim Indefiniteness: An Empirical Study of Definiteness
Cases of the Past Decade with a Focus on the Federal Circuit and the Insolubly Ambiguous Standard, 10 CHI.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 25 (2010) (finding that the Federal Circuit increasingly holds claims not
indefinite).
205 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
203

Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted); see id. at 1376 (“A decision holding a patent invalid for indefiniteness presents a
question of law, which we review de novo.”).
206

207 See, e.g., Ex parte Crenshaw, No. 2008-4083, 2008 WL 6678100, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 18,
2008) (“Claims are indefinite ‘if reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile,’ that is, if a
claim ‘is insolubly ambiguous, and no narrowing construction can properly be adopted.’” (quoting
Exxon, 265 F.3d at 1375)); Ex parte Spina, No. 2008-2016, 2008 WL 4768094, at *2-3 (B.P.A.I.
Oct. 31, 2008) (reversing an examiner’s rejection for indefiniteness because the claims were not
“insolubly ambiguous”); Ex parte Saaski, No. 2008-3989, 2008 WL 4752052, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Oct.
28, 2008) (same); Ex parte Machida, No. 2008-2096, 2008 WL 4449324, at *2, 5 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 4,
2008) (same).
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more plausible constructions,”208 other PTO decisions have continued to
improperly apply the higher standard.209 And once these unclear patent
applications are granted, they receive the presumption of validity, making
them even less likely to be struck down as indefinite.
A review of all 324 Federal Circuit patentability decisions over five
years found only one that distinguished a precedent based on the different
standards.210 Indeed, there is even some dissent within the Federal Circuit
regarding whether the contexts are really different: when affirming a
nonobviousness judgment in Fresenius v. Baxter, Judge Dyk noted that “[i]t is
entirely possible that the [PTO] will” invalidate the claims on
reexamination,211 while Judge Newman disputed that “a PTO decision on
reexamination [could] override a judicial decision.”212 The PTO did find the
claims obvious on reexamination, and the Federal Circuit affirmed, noting
the different evidentiary standards.213 Judge Newman dissented from the
panel decision and from the denial of rehearing en banc, describing the
PTO’s decision as “administrative nullification of a final judicial decision.”214
The three-judge concurrence in the rehearing denial explained the different
standards:
In a court proceeding, a patent is not found “valid.” A
judgment in favor of a patent holder in the face of an invalidity
defense or counterclaim merely means that the patent
challenger has failed to carry its burden of establishing
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence in that particular
case—premised on the evidence presented there.215
But the opinion was still criticized as an example of the PTO overruling
Federal Circuit, as if there were no difference between validity decisions in
the two contexts.216 As long as some patent decisionmakers treat infringement
208

Ex parte Miyazaki, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1207, 1211 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 19, 2008).

See, e.g., Ex parte Golle, No. 2011-005718, 2012 WL 5937546, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23,
2012) (reversing an examiner’s rejection for indefiniteness because the claims were not “insolubly
ambiguous”); Ex parte Kessel, No. 2011-004050, 2012 WL 4165616, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 17, 2012)
(same); Ex parte Coble, No. 2011-004125, 2012 WL 4483292, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 17, 2012)
(same); Ex parte Dionne, No. 2011-003995, 2012 WL 3613695, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 21, 2012)
(same).
209

210 See Ouellette, supra note 9, at 369 & n.119; In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“[T]he court’s final judgment and the examiner’s rejection are not duplicative—they are
differing proceedings with different evidentiary standards for validity.”).
211 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Dyk, J.,
concurring).
212 Id. at 1305 n.1 (Newman, J., concurring).
213 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
214 Id. at 1366 (Newman, J., dissenting); see In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 698 F.3d 1349, 1351-55
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).

Baxter, 689 F.3d at 1351 (O’Malley, J., concurring). The parties subsequently disputed the
effect of a PTO reexamination proceeding on a pending infringement action. Fresenius USA, Inc.
v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 733 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
216 See, e.g., Kevin E. Noonan, In re Baxter International, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2012), PATENT DOCS
(May 17, 2012, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/05/in-re-baxter-international-inc215

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

37

and examination precedents equivalently, the potential for patent-related
deference mistakes will continue.
Trademarks might raise the same sorts of issues that we see in the
patent context. A trademark is only valid if it is “distinctive,” and if a mark
does not have “inherent” distinctiveness—i.e., if it is merely descriptive of the
product it signifies—it must have “acquired” distinctiveness (known as
“secondary meaning”), such that buyers view the mark as uniquely distinctive
of a particular source of goods.217 The PTO’s refusal to register a mark—
based on either lack of inherent distinctiveness or lack of secondary
meaning—is reviewed for substantial evidence.218 Registration creates a
rebuttable presumption that a mark is distinctive.219 And when a court of
appeals considers a challenge to trademark validity in infringement litigation,
it must consider both this evidentiary presumption and the deferential
standard of review, as distinctiveness is a factual issue that can only be
reversed if clearly erroneous.220
For example, in Nautilus Group, Inc. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,221 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement suit, including the finding that “Bowflex” is a strong mark (i.e.,
is inherently distinctive). The Federal Circuit said that it “cannot say that . . .
the court clearly erred in preliminarily finding Bowflex to be a suggestive
mark,” and that it “d[id] not think the court clearly erred in finding that [the
mark owner] has strengthened a presumptively weak suggestive mark through
its advertising.” Nautilus was then cited by the PTO as support for the
conclusion that the unregistered BEST REST was not merely descriptive.222
If the presumptions of validity for granted patents and trademarks are
indeed contributing to doctrinal inflation in these contexts, one solution might
be to change the formal legal rules, such as by eliminating the presumption of
validity—a route the Supreme Court recently rejected in the patent context
in Microsoft v. i4i,223 contrary to the urgings of patent law academics.224 But
fed-cir-2012.html; Matthew R. Osenga, PTO Overrules Federal Circuit, INVENTIVE STEP (May 18,
2012, 10:23 AM), http://inventivestep.net/2012/05/18/pto-overrules-federal-circuit.
217 See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law 3 (Working Paper,
Jan. 15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195989 (summarizing the requirements for
a trademark to be protectable).

See In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The determination
that a mark is merely descriptive is a factual finding, and this court reviews the [PTO’s] fact
finding for substantial evidence.”); In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“Whether an asserted mark is inherently distinctive is a factual determination made by the
[PTO].”).
219 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 192, § 11:43.
220 See id. § 11:3.
221 372 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
218

222

2011).

Dreamwell, Ltd. v. Kittrich Corp., No. 91188186, 2011 WL 1495462 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 29,

223 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (affirming a heightened
evidentiary standard for establishing invalidity of a granted patent).
224 See Brief Amici Curiae of 37 Law, Business, and Economics Professors in Support of
Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (No. 10-290).
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the nebulous impact of mandatory sequencing in the qualified immunity
context illustrates that simply changing the formal rules might not help,
depending on the source of deference.225 In the patent context, even without
a formal presumption of validity, courts might simply be more reluctant to
invalidate issued patents and disrupt settled expectations than to reject a new
patent application. We discuss this option further in Part IV.
*

*

*

This Part has shown that deference mistakes are far from theoretical.
Habeas precedents holding that a federal right was not “clearly established”
have been relied on in standard criminal cases to conclude that the right does
not exist. Criminal appeals holding that an error did not rise to the level of
“plain error” have been used to justify affirmances where the standard of
review was supposed to be more searching. Opinions holding that evidentiary
rulings were not abuses of discretion have been read as stronger statements
on whether the evidence should be allowed. And decisions upholding patents
in the infringement context have been used to justify granting new patents
that are not entitled to the same presumption of validity. In short: courts
make deference mistakes. In the following Part, we develop a model to show
how the cumulative effect of such mistakes can be a systematic doctrinal shift.

III. A Model of Deference Mistakes
A single deference mistake, by itself, may be a significant matter. A
judge may decide a case incorrectly, or litigants may settle a case for more or
less than it is worth (or incorrectly decide to pursue or not pursue the case in
the first place), because of such a misinterpretation. Misinterpretations might
also propagate if a court incorrectly cites a prior opinion and subsequent
courts rely upon the mistaken citation without noticing the mistake.226 But
courts and parties make errors of many types on a regular basis.227 There is
no reason to believe that deference mistakes are more common or more
severe than any other type of error.

225

See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.

Cf. EEOC v. Serv. Temps Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n neither case does
the chain of citations and authorities lead to any substantive support for the proposition that those
courts apply.”); Adam D. Chandler, Comment, Puerto Rico’s Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, 120
YALE L.J. 2183, 2191 (2011) (“[T]he First Circuit’s now-settled holding on Puerto Rico’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity is ultimately based on a judicial game of ‘telephone.’”).
226

227 See, e.g., Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419, 423-24 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
government had “conceded that Article 314 of the Constitution of Mexico,” which it had relied
on in numerous prior cases, “does not exist and never did”); Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts:
Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1600 (2013); Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2008. See generally Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense of How
Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013)
(arguing that judicial attention is a scarce resource and that error correction will never be perfectly
achieved).
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Yet the effect of these errors will not necessarily be confined to the
cases in which they occur. Over time, across large numbers of cases,
deference mistakes can systematically skew legal doctrine. Any type of judicial
error could, of course, affect legal doctrine. But errors will only exert a
systematic skew on doctrine if they are biased in one direction or another.
Most types of judicial errors will be randomly distributed.228 But that is not
the case for deference mistakes, which could point systematically in one
direction or another depending upon how courts and doctrine are structured.
In the sections that follow, we set forth a model of deference mistakes and
describe the mechanisms that could generate systematic evolution of the law.
A. Deference Regimes: A Typology
As we explained above, we are interested in situations in which, at
time t1, court C1 decides a particular legal issue. At time t2, court C2 is
confronted by a similar legal issue in a different case, and C1’s opinion is
either binding or persuasive precedent.229 As we described, a deference
mistake occurs when C2 relies on C1’s opinion without fully accounting for
the deference regime under which C1 decided the prior case, thereby using
the precedent in a way C1 may not have intended.
The cases that interest us can arise in multiple ways. There are cases
in which the deference regime is a deferential burden of proof or standard of
evidence, such as “clear and convincing evidence” or “clearly established
federal law.” In these cases, C1 applies the particular burden of proof, which
may include deference to a prior decisionmaker C0. C2 later misunderstands
the standard applied by C1. Alternatively, there are cases in which the
deference regime arises from a standard of review. That is, there is a lower
court C0 that produces a judgment at t0. This judgment is then reviewed—
under some standard of deference—by C1 at t1. C2 later misunderstands the
deference regime applied by C1. The interaction between C0 and C1 is very
important to the mechanisms we describe, but fundamentally it is the
relationship between C1’s precedent and C2’s interpretation of that precedent
that can drive long-term evolution in the law. We do not differentiate
between deferential burdens of proof and standards of review in our model
because they are analytically similar.230
Courts can generate deference mistakes in three distinct
circumstances. First, some areas of law are governed by what we call
228 It is of course possible that random errors will not be evenly distributed, particularly if the
overall number of errors is low. But in expectation, they will be evenly distributed.

C1 and C2 could be any combination of appellate courts, trial courts, administrative
bodies, or other decisionmakers; all that is necessary is that C2 would consider C1’s opinion to
be at least persuasive on the issue.
230 Consider, for instance, “arbitrary and capricious” review of agency rulemaking by federal
courts. 5 U.S.C. § 706. This could be thought of as a unitary burden of proof: a party challenging
a rulemaking must always prove that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Or it
could be thought of as a standard of review: the federal court (C1) is reviewing the agency’s
decision (C0) with deference and will overturn it only if it was arbitrary and capricious. The two
ideas can be modeled identically, and so we do not differentiate between them here.
229

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

40

“asymmetric” deference regimes, in the sense that legal issues sometimes
reach appellate courts under a more deferential standard that always favors
one type of party. For example, Section II.A described the legal regimes for
habeas and § 1983, which are biased toward the government (as compared
with direct criminal appeals), and Section II.B described the legal regimes for
granted patents and trademarks, which are biased toward the IP holder (as
compared with cases involving IP rights that the PTO has not yet approved).
We describe these areas of law as being governed by asymmetric deference
regimes because only the government, and only IP rightsholders, will ever be
the beneficiaries of the more deferential standard of review.
Second, some legal issues arise under what we call “symmetric”
deference regimes. Consider, for example, evidentiary questions, which can
arrive at the courts of appeal under either of two deference regimes: abuse of
discretion or plain error. A court mistaking a precedent governed by one
regime for the other would be making a deference mistake. Importantly,
however, either deference regime can attach to either side of an evidentiary
question: evidentiary admissions and exclusions can each be reviewed for
either abuse of discretion or plain error.231 Accordingly, as a conceptual
matter both sides could benefit equally from the various deferential standards
of review, though as we will see the practical situation may be quite different.
Third and finally, courts can generate deference mistakes even if there
is only one applicable deference regime. For instance, when a party loses a
motion for change of venue or forum non conveniens and appeals, review is
for abuse of discretion.232 Even if appellate courts were only ever confronted
with change of venue appeals governed by an abuse of discretion regime,
deference mistakes might nonetheless result, as we will explain below in Part
III.C. We hesitate to claim that the law of venue and forum (or any other
legal issue) is “governed” by this sort of “unitary” deference regime, because
it is always possible that a case might reach the appellate courts under a plain
error standard if one party failed to object below.233 Rather, our claim is that
courts may generate deference mistakes even if they only ever review cases
under a single standard of review.
In the sections that follow, we present a model of judicial
decisionmaking that explains how systematic asymmetries in the law might
allow deference mistakes to propagate and eventually influence the long-term

231 While plain error review of evidentiary exclusions might seem unusual, there are many
cases in which the court of appeals has found that the party offering the evidence failed to preserve
the proper argument. See, e.g., Perkins v. Silver Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d
1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Roti, 484 F.3d 934, 936 (7th Cir. 2007); Watson v.
O'Neill, 365 F.3d 609, 615 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1048
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
232 See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 338 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We review all questions
concerning venue under the abuse of discretion standard.”); Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc.,
529 F.3d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (“This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
on forum non conveniens grounds for abuse of discretion.”).
233 See, e.g., United States v. McCorkle, 688 F.3d 518, 522 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing a venue
challenge for plain error).
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evolution of the law. We begin with areas governed by asymmetric deference
regimes in Section III.B. Rather than proceed to symmetric deference
regimes, we then detour to consider a model of unitary deference regimes in
Section III.C. The reason for this is that unitary regimes are actually a special
case of symmetric deference regimes, and our model of symmetric deference
regimes will draw upon and build from our model of unitary deference
regimes. Finally, in Section III.D we address symmetric deference regimes.
One final note is in order. It is perhaps evident that C0, C1, and C2,
the various actors in our models, all might be multi-member bodies. C0 might
be a district court composed of multiple different district judges, or an agency
with many decisionmakers. C1 is often an appellate court composed of
multiple judges who sit in panels. And C2 may well be the same (or a similarly
situated) appellate court, or the same district court or agency as C0. For ease
of explication we will generally refer to C0, C1, and C2 as unitary actors, but
our analysis generalizes fully to the case of multi-member actors. That is,
when we discuss how C1 or C2 would decide a case, we are really describing
how the median member of that court (or agency) would vote. When we
describe the possibility that C0 or C1 might make random errors, we also
mean to include the possibility that one judge (or a three-judge panel) of those
courts will have a different view of the law than the court itself holds. Our use
of unitary-actor shorthand is not meant to obscure any substantive
consideration. We now turn to our model of deference regimes and deference
mistakes.
B. Asymmetric Deference Regimes
As described above, some legal questions can arise under a deferential
burden of proof or legal standard that systematically favors a particular class
of litigants. Here, we use patent law as our paradigm case to illustrate our
model of deference mistakes.
For ease of explication we employ a linear model of judicial
decisionmaking, in which all cases can be arrayed along a single dimension.
Here, in our patent example, the cases range from strongest (for the patent
holder) to weakest—that is, from the least likely to be invalid to the most
likely. Following attitudinal models of judging, we assign the Federal Circuit
two “ideal points” or “cutpoints”: one for cases governed by a clear-andconvincing evidence standard, and one for cases governed by a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.234 (That is, along any given
dimension of patentability, each judge, were she left to her own devices,
would draw a line at a given point and allow patents up to that point and no

See, e.g., Masur, supra note 195, at 483 (employing such a model); GLENDON SCHUBERT,
THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 19461963, at 220 (1965); see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989) (quantifying Justices’ ideological
preferences).
234
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further.235) The further to the right, the more permissive the standard. Figure
1 displays this graphically:
Figure 1: The Federal Circuit’s Patent Cutpoints
Stronger case for
patent validity

Preponderance
cutpoint

Clear-and-convincing
cutpoint
Weaker case for
patent validity
validity.

Each time a federal court or the PTO (C2) reviews a patent’s validity
(or a patent application’s patentability), it will inevitably turn to some
precedents, primarily from the Federal Circuit (C1). Suppose C2 misreads a
clear-and-convincing evidence case (either invalidating or upholding a
patent), as having been decided instead under a preponderance standard. It
will have misunderstood that precedent as more favorable to the patent than
it actually was. The misunderstood precedent may then affect C2’s decision,
causing the court to err in a patent-favoring direction. Or suppose instead
that C2 misreads a case decided under a preponderance standard as a clearand-convincing evidence case. It will have misunderstood that precedent as
less favorable to the patent than it actually was. The misunderstood precedent
may then cause C2 to err in an anti-patent direction if the precedent
influences its eventual decision.
Crucially, that new C2 precedent will then influence subsequent
decisions even if future courts never make the same deference mistake that C2 made. By
integrating its deference mistake into an opinion, C2 has effectively enshrined
the mistake while simultaneously sanitizing it, making it much more difficult
for a subsequent court to recognize and correct the mistake.236
Thus, each deference mistake can alter the overall shape of the law.
The C2 precedent, which includes the deference mistake, will influence the
law in one direction or another—in a patent-favoring direction, in our
example. This means that all courts that would treat C2’s decision as
precedential or influential will adjust their cutpoints in light of it. In theory, if
C2 made repeated mistakes of a single type—either pro-patent or antipatent—these mistakes could push the law further and further in one
direction. This would be a highly significant development. Individual
mistakes in particular cases are naturally important, but they occur frequently
235 See Masur, supra note 195, at 483; Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact
Discretion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18-20 (2008) (employing an ideal point-based model); Pauline T.
Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel
Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1347 (2009) (employing an ideal point model of judging);
Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 769, 780-82 (2008) (explaining the use of ideal points in decision models).
236 C2’s decisions can enshrine deference mistakes even if it lacks formal precedential value.
For example, if C2 is the PTO, and it repeatedly makes deference mistakes to grant patents that
should not have been granted, those granted patents will then be entitled to the presumption of
validity and will be more likely to survive challenges in the infringement context.
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and for a wide variety of reasons. An overall long-term trend in the law,
which will naturally influence hundreds or thousands of subsequent cases, is a
much more serious matter.
This long-run trend in legal change will only materialize if courts
produce more of one type of error than another—more pro-plaintiff mistakes
than pro-defendant ones, or the reverse. Suppose, however, that equal
numbers of cases reach the appellate court C1 under each standard. That
court will create equally many opportunities for C2 to err in expansionary or
restrictive directions. Over long periods of time, we would expect no net
effect on overall legal doctrine. Courts may make occasional mistakes, but
those mistakes will be random, rather than biased. Thus, we can say that
deference mistakes related to differing legal standards will generate no net
legal change so long as two conditions hold:
1) C1 reviews the same number of cases under the deferential standard
as under the non-deferential standard.
2) C2 is equally likely to misread a case’s deference regime whether it
was decided with or without deference.
In the sections that follow, we propose a variety of reasons why those
conditions may not hold and describe the ramifications for long-term
evolution in the law.
1. Unequal Numbers of Cases
There are a number of simple and straightforward reasons why
deferential and non-deferential cases might arise in different numbers. First,
one type of case might simply be more common than another due to
structural factors endogenous to the case types. For instance, criminal
prosecutions—in which constitutional rights are evaluated with zero
deference—are far more common than § 1983 suits for damages, in which
the plaintiff must prove that the right violated was “clearly established.”237
Similarly, many more patent infringement lawsuits than direct PTO appeals
reach the Federal Circuit each year.238
237 In the year prior to March 31, 2013, the federal district courts saw 69,449 new criminal
cases, as compared with 17,099 prisoner civil rights suits. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2013, at tbls.C-2, D (2013).
238 A review of Federal Circuit cases on patent validity found that 73% of all written opinions
(237 out of 324), or 80% of precedential opinions (181 out of 226), arose in the context of
infringement actions. Ouellette, supra note 9, at 359 tbl.2. The reason for this is somewhat unclear,
as there are hundreds of thousands of patent applications filed every year and “only” thousands of
infringement suits. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2012, at 50 tbl.C-2 (2012) (reporting that 4,446 patent cases were
commenced during the previous twelve months); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 176 tbl.2 (2012) (showing
that in recent years the PTO has received around 500,000 patent applications each year).

One explanation is that if the patent applicant eventually prevails before the PTO, there is no
opposing party to appeal, whereas in patent litigation, one side or the other will always be
aggrieved. In addition, the cost of pursuing a Federal Circuit appeal might exceed the expected
value of the median individual patent that has not yet been granted. If patents amount to lottery
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In other instances, one type of case may be a subset of the other type,
ensuring that asymmetric numbers of cases reach the courts. For instance,
within the criminal justice system every petition for habeas corpus must be
preceded by a criminal prosecution. An individual cannot petition for habeas
unless she has first been convicted and imprisoned. Moreover, prisoners are
required to exhaust their direct appeals before a court will entertain a habeas
petition. Thus, habeas petitions almost always arise only after there has been
a full trial on the merits and a full complement of appeals.239
In sum, in the criminal procedure context, far more cases reach the
courts under non-deferential standards than under deferential ones, creating
more opportunities for pro-rights (anti-state) deference errors. In the patent
context, on the other hand, far more cases reach the courts under the
deferential standard than under a non-deferential standard, creating more
opportunities for pro-patent errors. More generally, under any area of law
that involves asymmetric deference regimes, it would be surprising (and quite
coincidental) if there happened to be equal numbers of cases decided with
and without deference. Accordingly, we believe that there will always be
unequal numbers of cases and asymmetric opportunities for C2 to generate
false positives and false negatives.
2. Asymmetric Errors by a Subsequent Court
The second assumption needed to generate unbiased (which is to say,
zero net) legal change is that a subsequent decisionmaker (C2) is equally likely
to mistake a given case decided with deference for one decided without
deference, as it is to mistake a case decided without deference for one decided
with deference. As with the prior assumption of equal numbers of cases, we
believe that this assumption is entirely unrealistic. We relax it here.
We first note that it seems unlikely that C2 would make a deference
mistake involving a precedent that involved the same deference regime that
C2 is applying. Such a mistake would require C2 to distinguish a precedent by
explicitly misstating its deference regime, such as by writing, “In the present
clear-and-convincing evidence case, this precedent decided by C1 is
inapplicable because it was decided under a preponderance standard,” when
it was in fact decided under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard.
Mistakes seem far more likely to occur when C2 simply ignores a precedent’s
deference regime. But is C2 more likely to err by relying on a clear-andconvincing evidence precedent in a preponderance case, or vice versa?
tickets, with potentially great or small value, the value of a typical lottery ticket may be well below
the known fixed cost of an appeal. On the other hand, once litigation has begun, the expected
value of taking an appeal may far outstrip the cost of turning to the Federal Circuit.
239 The exception to this rule is when the habeas petition involves a claim that the defendant
has been deprived of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court has indicated
that such claims are better heard in the context of habeas petitions than direct appeals because of
the difficulty in bringing an ineffective assistance claim while represented by the same attorney
alleged to have been ineffective. Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the lone
type of constitutional criminal procedure claim that might arise more frequently in habeas
petitions than in direct non-deferential appeals.
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Although it is impossible to know for certain, we suspect that two
distinct effects influence the likelihood of C2 making a deference error of one
type or another. The first is the majority effect: C2 is more likely to err when
confronted with a case that employs a less common deference regime. This
effect should seem intuitive. If C2 is habituated to relying on precedents that
use a clear-and-convincing evidence standard or some other deferential rule,
it may come to treat that standard as a default. C2 will reflexively expect that
any given case it seizes upon must have employed such a standard.
The second effect is the non-deferential effect: C2 will default to believing
that every case was decided by C1 under the non-deferential legal standard.
This effect draws upon several related phenomena. First, it seems likely that
when a court examines a precedential prior case, it looks first for the legal rule
and holding, and only secondarily (if at all) for the operative deference
regime. In the absence of any information regarding the deference standard,
the court will likely default to the “neutral” position, which is zero deference.
Second, C2 may believe, correctly or incorrectly, that deference standards are
irrelevant to judicial decisionmaking and that C1 decided its case without
deference, regardless of what C1 wrote in the opinion.240 Third and finally,
evaluating a precedent decided under a deference standard will be more
cognitively taxing for a court than evaluating a precedent decided nondeferentially. The legal result and the deference standard employed may
sometimes conflict, as when C1 decides for the party deserving deference but
appears to indicate that it does not believe that party had the stronger case.
There is ample psychological evidence demonstrating that individuals shy
away from cognitively difficult tasks.241 Accordingly, C2 may attempt,
consciously or unconsciously, to shirk the difficult job of navigating these two
ideas. All told, courts will tend to default to viewing prior precedents through
non-deferential prisms.
In some contexts, the majority effect and the non-deferential effect
will point in the same direction. For instance, criminal trials are much more
common than habeas and § 1983 proceedings, and so questions of federal
criminal procedure arise much more commonly in a non-deferential posture
than a deferential one. Accordingly, both the majority and non-deferential
effects suggest that courts are more likely to err when confronted with
deferential (“clearly established”) precedents, treating them as non-deferential
precedents—and biasing courts in an anti-rights direction. In other contexts,
however, the effects pull in opposite directions. As we have previously noted,
the vast majority of the patent cases that reach the Federal Circuit are appeals
in infringement lawsuits. In these cases, a defendant must put forth clear and
convincing evidence to prove a patent invalid. Accordingly, when the Federal
Circuit (or the PTO) reads precedents, it most frequently comes across
precedents decided according to a deferential standard.

240
241

If C2 is correct, then it has effectively avoided a mistake. See infra note 243.
See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
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When these two effects conflict, which will dominate? This is
ultimately a difficult empirical question, and one to which there will likely be
different answers in different contexts.
3. Effects in Combination
In combination, the breaking of both symmetries—the number of
deferential and non-deferential precedents, and the likelihood of a deference
mistake given a particular precedent—might produce counter-intuitive
results. Asymmetries in case numbers and in types of deference mistakes will
not necessarily be mutually reinforcing. Rather, in some cases they may
mitigate one another.
The example of federal criminal procedure questions in the context of
habeas and § 1983 illustrates this point. As we noted above, there are many
more cases in which criminal procedure issues reach the courts under a low
deference regime than a high deference regime. Accordingly, there are many
more opportunities for C2 to generate pro-rights deference mistakes.
However, both the majority effect and the non-deferential effect would seem
to make it much more likely that C2 would err when faced with a deferential
precedent than when faced with a non-deferential one. A deferential
precedent from C1 is much more likely to lead to an anti-rights deference
mistake than a non-deferential precedent is to lead to a pro-rights deference
mistake. On the side of pro-rights errors, then, there is a low probability of
error coupled with a large number of opportunities to err; on the side of antirights errors there is a higher probability of error coupled with a smaller
number of opportunities.
Which of these effects will dominate is ultimately another empirical
question, and one we are not yet prepared to answer. Based on the discussion
above and the examples presented in Section II.A, it seems likely that there
will be more anti-rights deference mistakes than pro-rights deference
mistakes.242 But the more general observation is that it would be quite a
242 It is worth noting that a “false positive” will not drive the law in the direction one might
expect. In criminal procedure cases, deference (if it is appropriate) is awarded to state actors—
police and state courts, for the most part—who are opposing the right in question in the context of
a § 1983 lawsuit or habeas petition. By consequence, a predominance of false positives will lead to
a contraction in the underlying criminal procedure right at issue.

This gives rise to an interesting set of hypotheses regarding the expansion and contraction of
criminal procedure rights in the United States. During the 1960s, the Warren Court engaged in a
well-documented expansion of substantive criminal procedure rights. This expansion was
accompanied by a concomitant expansion in individuals’ rights to bring habeas and § 1983
lawsuits. These procedural mechanisms often served as the vehicles for bringing substantive
constitutional claims into federal court, particularly in the face of hostile state actors. Since the end
of the Warren Court era, criminal procedure rights have gradually contracted along nearly every
dimension. Scholars have attributed this contraction to the work of more ideologically
conservative subsequent courts, who disagreed with the Warren Court and sought to undo much
of its work. This is very possible, but it is also possible that the trend was helped along by the types
of deference mistakes we describe here. The growth of § 1983 and habeas cases could have
introduced into the case law ever-increasing numbers of deferential precedents. Those precedents
could then have given rise to false positive deference mistakes. Those deference mistakes would
then have led over time to contraction in the underlying substantive criminal rights.
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remarkable happenstance if these factors cancelled each other out and
resulted in zero net legal movement. It is almost certain that for any such
regime involving biased deferential legal standards, deference mistakes will
drive the law in one direction or another.
C. Unitary Deference Regimes
We now turn to the possibility that deference mistakes might occur
even if every single case on a given legal question is governed by the same
deference regime. Again, it may be that no legal issue is ever limited to a
single deference regime. There is always the possibility that a party will fail to
preserve its objection at trial, leading to review for plain error. Our point is
simply that courts can generate deference mistakes even if they saw only cases
governed by a single deference regime. Additionally, the model we present
here will serve as the foundation for our model of symmetric deference
regimes in Section III.D.
Consider a legal issue that is decided in the first instance by a district
court (C0) and then reviewed by an appellate court (C1). Our paradigm case is
a motion for change of venue or forum non conveniens, though the
possibilities are legion. The appellate court C1 will have its own idea of what
the law should be—its own view as to when the plaintiff should prevail and
when the defendant should prevail. That is, it will have in mind some legal
cutpoint that divides the two sets of cases. We use the words “case,”
“plaintiff,” and “defendant” for ease of explication, but more generally, the
appellate court will have a view regarding which issues (rather than cases)
should be decided in favor of the moving party (rather than the plaintiff), and
which issues should be decided in favor of the non-moving party (rather than the
defendant). Figure 2 displays C1’s cutpoint graphically:
Figure 2: The Appellate Court’s Cutpoint
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case for
defendant

Stronger case for
plaintiff

If C0 has a different cutpoint, or simply because of random errors or
assignments to different district judges, C0 may not decide every case in the
same way that C1 would. C0 may decide in favor of the plaintiff in a few cases
where C1 would decide in favor of the defendant, and vice versa. Figure 3
illustrates this phenomenon.
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Figure 3: C0 Adjudication of Cases
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case for
plaintiff

Stronger case for
defendant

Cases decided for plaintiff by C0
Cases decided for defendant by C0

The prior section focused on deferential legal standards, under which
C1 effectively has two cutpoints. Deference mistakes can also arise out of C1’s
deference to the initial decisionmaker, C0. Even if C0 does not decide every
case as C1 would, C1 may have some range of outcomes within which it will
defer to C0’s decision and affirm the outcome, even if it would have made a
different one were it writing on a clean slate. Figure 4 displays this type of
deference regime graphically.
Figure 4: C1 Zone of Deference
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case for
plaintiff

Stronger case for
defendant

Cases decided for plaintiff by C0
C1’s range of deference
Cases decided for defendant by C0

If C1 affirms a decision by C0 despite the fact that it would have
decided the case differently in the absence of deference, we label that decision
a “deference affirmance.” These cases are represented in Figure 4 (above) and
Figure 5 (below) by the black circles to the right of C1’s cutpoint and the white
circles to the left of C1’s cutpoint that fall within C1’s range of deference.
White circles to the left of the cutpoint and black circles to the right of the
cutpoint that fall outside C1’s range of deference will be reversed. These
reversals, which occur despite the deference afforded C0’s decision by C1, are
“deference reversals.” In Figure 5, we label the deference affirmances and
reversals explicitly.
Figure 5: Deference Affirmances and Reversals
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case for
defendant

Stronger case for
plaintiff

Cases decided for plaintiff by C0
Deference affirmances
Deference reversals

Cases decided for defendant by C0

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

49

Each time C1 affirms a case it would have decided differently under a
de novo standard, it should write an opinion explaining that its decision is
based at least in part on the fact that it was obliged to defer to the lower
court, C0. And each time C1 reverses a case despite the fact that it is affording
deference to C0, it should write an opinion explaining that it has reversed
despite that deference. A subsequent court C2 that reads the opinion carefully
should have a good sense as to where C1 stood on the underlying issue.
However, deference affirmances and reversals also represent opportunities for
C2 to err. If C2 reads a C1 deference affirmance and mistakenly believes it to
be an honest affirmance—the outcome C1 would have reached if deciding the
case de novo—it has misunderstood the underlying law. Likewise for a
deference reversal: if C2 believes the reversal is an honest statement of C1’s
own view of the law, rather than the much stronger statement that the case
must be reversed despite C1’s deference to C0, it has misunderstood the
import of C1’s precedent.
Suppose C1 affirms a dubious ruling in favor of a plaintiff. If C2
believes that this is C1’s honest view of the law, it will have mistakenly
interpreted the law as more plaintiff-friendly than C1 meant it to be. The
same is true if C1 reverses a ruling in favor of a plaintiff and C2
misunderstands this as C1’s de novo view, rather than the very strong prodefendant statement it is: that too means that C2 will have interpreted the law
as more plaintiff-friendly than C1 meant it to be. In very concrete terms, C2
might think to itself: “I see that C1 affirmed a ruling in favor of the plaintiff in
an analogous case. C1 must have believed that the plaintiff deserved to win
given the operative law and facts.” Or, in the case of a deference reversal: “I
see that C1 reversed a ruling in favor of the plaintiff in an analogous case. But
here the operative law and facts are slightly more pro-plaintiff, so C1 might
believe that the plaintiff deserves to win on this issue.” Similarly, in cases
where C0’s ruling favored the defendant, C2 might misunderstand C1’s
deference affirmance or deference reversal as more defendant-friendly than
C1 meant.
It may seem peculiar or counter-intuitive to imagine a plaintiff losing
on appeal, and that precedent then giving rise to a mistaken interpretation
that favors the plaintiff. But such a result is entirely possible. The question is
how a precedent is perceived relative to what the court actually decided. If C1
reverses a decision favoring a plaintiff, despite the deference due to that
decision, it has made a very strong statement about the wrongness off the
earlier decision and how far it diverges from governing law. If C2 then
mistakenly believes that C1 was applying something like a de novo standard, it
will miss the full import of this statement and C1’s judgment as to how
incorrect C0’s decision really was. It is the difference between a case falling
outside of C1’s deference range (what has actually occurred) and believing
only that a case falls to one side of C1’s cutpoint (what C2 might think).243

243 Courts could conceivably make equal and opposite mistakes if it is C1, rather than C2,
which employs the incorrect standard of review. Suppose C1 decided (consciously or
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The deference mistakes described above can give rise to erroneous
outcomes in individual cases. Suppose that C0 decides an issue for the
plaintiff, C1 upholds that judgment under a deference standard, and then C2
commits a deference mistake by interpreting C1’s affirmance as that court’s
true view. Believing that C1’s precedent is very plaintiff-friendly on account of
this error, C2 might then decide its case in favor of the plaintiff rather than
the defendant. This creates a new precedent, one that would not have existed
(at least in that form) but for C2’s deference mistake. Again, that new C2
precedent will then influence subsequent decisions even if future courts never make
the same deference mistake that C2 made. C2 has integrated its mistake into existing
doctrine while stripping it of any outward indications of error.
As we have already described, these mistakes can systematically shift
doctrine over time. Each case in which C2 makes a deference mistake stands
as a precedent for future courts, whether or not they make their own
deference mistakes. This means that all courts that would treat C2’s decision
as precedential or influential will adjust their cutpoints in light of it. In theory,
if C2 made repeated mistakes of a single type—either pro-plaintiff or prodefendant—these mistakes could push the law further and further in one
direction.
This long-run trend in legal change will only materialize if courts
produce more of one type of error than another—more pro-plaintiff mistakes
than pro-defendant ones, or the reverse. Indeed, we should expect there to be
approximately equivalent numbers of mistakes in each direction—and thus
no long-run bias in the law—so long as four assumptions hold true:
1) C0’s errors or deviations from C1’s cutpoint—what C1 believes the
law should be—are distributed evenly around C1’s cutpoint.
2) Plaintiffs and defendants appeal similarly situated cases at
equivalent rates.
3) C1’s zone of deference is symmetric around its cutpoint.
4) C2 is equally likely to make mistakes with respect to cases appealed
by plaintiffs and defendants.
If the first three assumptions hold, there will be approximately
equivalent numbers of deference affirmances for plaintiffs and defendants,
and approximately equivalent numbers of deference reversals for plaintiffs
and defendants. And because each deference affirmance or reversal presents
an opportunity for C2 to mistakenly interpret the law, there will be equivalent

unconsciously) to review a decision by C0 without deference, instead of affording it the deference it
was due. Suppose C2 then looked to C1’s decision as precedent and paid close attention to the
standard of review that C1 employed. This would be an error, in that C2 would have
misinterpreted the holding of C1’s precedent. However, we would not exactly consider it a
deference mistake, because the error would have arisen not because of the failure to understand a
precedent’s deference regime but because of C1’s failure (or refusal) to apply the law correctly.
Nonetheless, it is useful to bear in mind that just as C2 can generate errors in one direction by
misunderstanding C1’s precedent, C1 can generate errors in the opposite direction by
misrepresenting exactly what it has decided.
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numbers of opportunities for C2 to interpret the law mistakenly in a proplaintiff direction or a pro-defendant direction. The net overall effect on the
law should be neutral.
In the sections that follow, we relax these assumptions. In addition, we
introduce a number of other potential complications that can give rise to
asymmetries and create the potential for long-term movement in the law.
1. Biased Lower Decisionmaker
We begin by relaxing assumption #1. If C0 is a faithful agent of C1,
then C0’s deviations from C1’s cutpoint should all be random errors. These
errors should be randomly distributed around C1’s cutpoint. But what if C0 is
not a faithful agent but instead biased in one direction or another? C0’s bias
might be the result of ideological predilection,244 or a non-ideological
normative view of what the law should be.245 It could also reflect C0’s
systematic misinterpretation of C1’s view of the law. C1 may not have clearly
specified the legal standard, or C0 may simply have misunderstood C1’s
holdings. If C0 is biased, its errors will be skewed in one direction. Suppose,
for instance, that C0 is more pro-defendant than C1. The mixture of cases
reaching C1 might appear as follows:
Figure 6: Biased Lower Court Decisionmaker
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case for
defendant

Stronger case for
plaintiff

Cases decided for plaintiff by C0
C1’s range of deference
Cases decided for defendant by C0

Because C0 is pro-defendant in comparison to C1, it will tend to
decide most close cases in pro-defendant fashion, creating far more
opportunities for C1 to issue pro-defendant deference affirmances and
reversals than pro-plaintiff ones. (In Figure 6, the three black dots to the right
244 A geographically or politically diverse judicial jurisdiction might have multiple subjurisdictions with widely divergent ideological or judicial philosophies. For instance, the Ninth
Circuit includes both the Northern District of California and the District of Idaho. The two
district courts (C0) might have very different cutpoints, as well as cutpoints that differ from the
Ninth Circuit (C1). If, for instance, the District of Idaho deviates from the Ninth Circuit’s
cutpoints while the remaining districts adhere to it, then C0 as a whole will have deviated from
C1’s view of the law. The same could be true within a large state. The Supreme Court of Texas
(C1) might have a cutpoint that differs significantly from the cutpoints of local courts in Austin (C0)
or Dallas (C0).
245 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrum; and a particular
judge’s emphasis may make a world of difference when it comes to rulings on evidence, the
temper of the courtroom, the tolerance for a proffered defense, and the like.”).
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of the cutpoint but within the zone of deference will be deference affirmances,
while the right-most black dot will be a deference reversal.) This skew will
exist whether plaintiffs and defendants appeal all cases or only those that are
relatively close to the ends of C1’s range of deference, as long as C0’s prodefendant bias is sufficiently strong that plaintiffs regularly decide it is
worthwhile to appeal cases that fall to the right of C1’s cutpoint.246
Crucially, deference mistakes resulting from both deference
affirmances and deference reversals of cases appealed by plaintiffs will operate
as pro-defendant errors. Regardless of how C1 decides an issue that a plaintiff
has appealed, its result will appear more pro-defendant than it actually was if
C2 forgets that C1 was deferring to C0’s original judgment in favor of the
defendant. If C1 affirms C0’s pro-defendant ruling, C2 may mistakenly think
that C1 actually believes the defendant had the stronger case. If C1 reverses
C0’s ruling, C2 may fail to appreciate what a strong statement C1 is making by
reversing a case to which it owed deference.
Thus, if C0 is biased in a pro-defendant direction, this bias can
generate long-term pro-defendant doctrinal evolution. The equal and
opposite effect would of course occur if C0 were biased in a pro-plaintiff
direction: long-term pro-plaintiff evolution in the law. What is striking about
this result is that our model generates biased legal evolution based entirely
upon a bias in a lower court (C0), even in the presence of a neutral appellate
court (C1).247
2. Differential Rates of Appeal
Similar long-term effects result if parties are differentially likely to
appeal decisions handed down by C0. Consider again Figure 3, which
displays approximately equal numbers of cases that C0 decided in favor of
plaintiffs and defendants that are near the outer boundaries of C1’s deference
range. These are the black dots (pro-defendant cases) near the right-most
dashed line and the white dots (pro-plaintiff cases) near the left-most dashed
line. This is to be expected, if C0 is an unbiased (but potentially error-prone)
decisionmaker.
Consider now the possibility that plaintiffs and defendants will appeal
different proportions of similarly situated cases. Scholars have suggested
numerous reasons why one side might be more likely to appeal in certain
types of cases. For instance, in tort lawsuits, defendants might be better-

246 We are currently holding to assumption #2 and assuming that plaintiffs and defendants
appeal similarly situated cases at equal rates.
247 Note, however, that this mechanism relies upon quite a strong bias on the part of C0. In
order to present a meaningfully greater number of opportunities for plaintiffs to appeal, C0 must
be deciding cases in favor of the defendant that fall at or near the right-most boundary of C1’s
deference range. These are cases in which the plaintiff would have a significant advantage under
typical circumstances. Accordingly, a relatively weak bias in one direction or another may not be
enough to generate significant long-term biased evolution in the law.

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

53

capitalized than plaintiffs and thus better able to bear the costs of appeals.248
Defense attorneys typically work on an hourly-fee basis, while plaintiff
attorneys are often paid on contingency, which might alter the incentives of
the attorneys and the parties to continue litigating past the initial stages.249
Defendants might also be more likely to be repeat players, giving them
incentives to appeal that extend beyond the case at hand.250 Alternatively,
any number of these factors could lead to higher rates of appeal by plaintiffs.
The point is that there is no reason that these rates need be the same.
Each appeal presents an opportunity for a deference affirmance or
reversal by C1, which in turn presents an opportunity for a deference mistake
by C2. Accordingly, if defendants appeal more cases, there will be more
deference mistakes involving defendant appeals. And as we have explained,
appeals by defendants will be from C0’s decisions in favor of plaintiffs and will
thus lead to pro-plaintiff deference mistakes. If C1 issues a deference affirmance
or reversal, and then C2 makes a deference mistake, C2 will have mistakenly
understood C1’s precedent as more plaintiff-friendly than it actually was. Thus,
by appealing with greater frequency, defendants may actually end up
nudging the law in a more plaintiff-friendly direction. Plaintiffs would create
the opposite effect if they were to appeal more frequently.
Of course, that effect would have to be balanced against whatever
overall movement in the law plaintiffs or defendants could generate by
appealing with greater frequency in the first place. That is, if parties on one
side of an issue appealed more regularly, and selected appeals carefully in
order to generate favorable precedents, that side might be capable over time
of shifting the law in a direction favorable to its interests. Deference mistakes
might generate some contrary movement in the law but may not counter-act
the secular trend created by parties’ efforts to affect the law.251
3. Asymmetric Zone of Deference
Now consider the possibility that C1 may not defer equally to
decisions by C0 in favor of the plaintiff and defendant. Suppose that C1 is very
deferential when C0 decides a case in favor of the plaintiff and much less

248 See Howard M. Erichson, The End of the Defendant Advantage in Tobacco Litigation, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 123, 125 (2001); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the
Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 881.
249 See Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, Reforming the Lawyer-Client Relationship Through
Alternative Billing Methods, 77 JUDICATURE 191, 192 (1994).
250 See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO.
L.J. 65, 75 (2010); Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still
Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 803, 804 (1999); Susan Brodie Haire, Stefanie A.
Lindquist & Roger Hartley, Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial Decisionmaking in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 668 (1999); Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson & Henry
Daley, So the Verdict Is in-What Happens Next? The Continuing Story of Tort Awards in the State Courts, 16
JUST. SYS. J. 97, 103 (1993); William H. Simon, The Prudent Jurist, LEGAL AFF., March/April 2005,
at 17.
251

cases).

See Gertner, supra note 181 (describing this phenomenon in the context of discrimination
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deferential when C0 decides a case in favor of the defendant. This might be
modeled as C1 having a smaller deference range on the plaintiff side of its
cutpoint and a larger deference range on the defendant side of its cutpoint.252
Figure 7 displays this in graphical form:
Figure 7: An Asymmetric Zone of Deference for C1
C1 cutpoint
Stronger case
defendant

for

Stronger case for
plaintiff

Cases decided for plaintiff by C0
C1’s range of deference
Cases decided for defendant by C0

This asymmetry could arise for a variety of reasons. Perhaps most
straightforwardly, C1 might have an ideological preference for one side of the
issue. Or C1 might believe that C0 is biased and mistrust its decisions favoring
one side. C1 might also believe that one side generally has a more difficult
time proving its cases for evidentiary reasons. Accordingly, it might be more
strongly inclined to defer when parties on that side do succeed.
This asymmetry will produce results very similar to what will occur if
one party appeals more than the other. If C1 is less deferential to decisions
favoring defendants, then plaintiffs will appeal greater numbers of cases. A
party will be most inclined to appeal cases falling outside (or near) C1’s
deference range, because those are the appeals it has the greatest chance of
winning. If C1’s deference range is smaller when it comes to cases decided in
favor of the defendant, then there will be more promising appeals for
plaintiffs to bring. As in the above analysis, this will result in greater numbers
of defendant-friendly deference mistakes and thus a long-term skew in the law
that favors defendants. And if C1 is more deferential to defendants than to
plaintiffs, the same principle will apply, mutatis mutandis, and we should
expect long-term legal evolution in favor of defendants. Of course, as before,
this long-run bias will act only as a counter-weight to any other secular trend
that might be created by greater numbers of appeals by one side.
4. Asymmetric Errors by a Subsequent Court
The foregoing subsections have dealt with asymmetries in how C0, C1,
and private parties make decisions. Our final subsection contemplates the
possibility that C2 may make asymmetric errors when reading and relying
upon prior decisions by C1. That is, C2 may be more likely to make a
deference mistake with respect to an affirmance of a pro-defendant decision

252 This is functionally equivalent to symmetric deference around a cutpoint that has been
shifted, but we describe it as asymmetric deference in order to better capture the reasons why C1
might adopt such a posture.
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than with respect to an affirmance of a pro-plaintiff decision.253 The results
dictated by such an asymmetry should be clear from what we have written
above. Greater numbers of deference mistakes in pro-defendant appeals will
lead to biased evolution in the law in a direction favoring defendants; greater
numbers of deference mistakes in pro-plaintiff appeals will lead to biased
evolution in the law favoring plaintiffs.
Alternatively, it is possible that C2 is more likely to make a deference
mistake when C1 issues a deference reversal than when it issues a deference
affirmance. When an appellate court upholds a lower court decision under a
deference standard, it is likely to emphasize the deference that it owes to the
lower court.254 In contrast, when issuing a deference reversal, C1 is likely to
deemphasize the deference it owes to C0 precisely because it is reversing C0
despite that deference. As C1 obscures its deferential posture, C2 becomes
more likely to miss that legal hook or misunderstand C2’s stance. The
probability of a deference mistake rises.
Of course, we might be entirely incorrect, and C2 might be more
likely to err with respect to deference affirmances. Regardless, this particular
asymmetry by itself will not be enough to generate long-term legal evolution.
The reason is that both pro-plaintiff errors and pro-defendant errors can arise
from either deference reversals or affirmances. However, if any other factor
were to disturb the equality between deference reversals favoring plaintiffs
and defendants, that asymmetry in combination with the greater propensity
of reversals to generate mistakes could lead to longer-term biased
development in the law. For instance, suppose that C1 is more deferential to
plaintiffs than defendants, as in Section III.C.3 above. Suppose further that
C2 is more likely to err with respect to deference reversals by C1. Many of the
additional appeals that plaintiffs bring will result in reversals. The counterintuitive result is that this will accentuate the long-term legal bias favoring
defendants.
5. Effects in Combination
It is important to note that the mechanisms described in the previous
four subsections are all independent of one another and conceivably
complementary. That is, consider an evidentiary objection related to hearsay,
which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. It is possible that (1) the trial courts
(C0) who consider these objections in the first instance are biased in favor of
It is difficult to specify why this might occur, but we can speculate. C2 might mistakenly
believe that different standards exist to govern cases decided in favor of defendants or plaintiffs.
There might be something about the way those cases are written that obscures the standard of
review more frequently when it comes to one type of case than another. C2 might believe that C1
is biased in favor of one side or another and impute different meanings to decisions by C1 in favor
of each of the two sides. Or C2 might be biased relative to C1 and be predisposed to make mistakes
in the direction of its bias due to motivated reasoning: unconsciously or consciously, it searches for
precedent to fit its preferences.
253

254 This is one mechanism for defending its opinion in the eyes of parties who might disagree
with it while avoiding taking its own strong stand. In addition, “deference” as a legal concept
generally has a positive valence.
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the non-moving party (the non-objector); (2) moving parties (objectors) appeal
more frequently; (3) the appellate court (C1) affords more deference to nonmoving parties; and (4) a subsequent court (C2) is more likely to make
deference errors with respect to deference affirmances than reversals. These
mechanisms would cumulatively bias doctrine in favor of non-moving parties,
with each mechanism reinforcing the others.
D. Symmetric Deference Regimes
Finally, we turn to legal issues governed by symmetric deference
regimes: situations in which either side to an issue might be able to receive
greater or lesser amounts of deference. Our canonical example is an
evidentiary objection. A trial court’s decision to admit or bar evidence is
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion,255 but that appeal is only for plain
error if the losing party failed properly to preserve its objection below.256 This
creates a situation in which a party on either side of the issue might be the
beneficiary of lesser (abuse of discretion) or greater (plain error) degrees of
deference on appeal. In some respects this functions as a combination of the
asymmetric and unitary regimes we described above. Our analysis combines
elements of those two discussions.
The added complication is that the direction in which a deference
mistake shifts the law will depend upon both the side that appeals and the
degree of deference afforded. Suppose that a party fails to object to the
introduction of evidence at trial (C0) and then later appeals C0’s decision to
allow the evidence. C1’s review is for plain error. Suppose further that C2
later relies upon C1’s case as precedent. Regardless of what C1 decided, if C2
makes a deference mistake, that mistake will push the law in an pro-evidence
direction. The reason is that failing to recognize the plain error standard will
make it appear as though the objecting party’s argument was weaker than it
really was, as C2 will believe that the objecting party lost (or won) on an abuse
of discretion standard (rather than the more stringent plain error).
The inverse is true as well. If, in this example, the party seeking to
block the evidence does object at trial, loses, and appeals, a later deference
mistake will shift the law in a pro-evidence direction. This is because C2 will
have mistakenly believed that the standard was plain error, rather than abuse
of discretion (which is correct), and will thus judge the result reached by C1 as
more favorable to the objecting party than it actually was.
The parallel analysis applies when it is the party seeking to introduce
evidence who loses at trial and appeals. If the party failed to preserve its
argument and a plain error standard applies, a later deference mistake by C2
will shift the law in an anti-evidence direction. If the party introducing
evidence preserved its argument and an abuse of discretion standard applies,
a later deference mistake by C2 will shift the law in a pro-evidence direction.

255

See supra Part III.C.

256

See supra note 231.
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To state the intuition somewhat more succinctly: the higher the
apparent deference standard, the stronger the apparent case of the party
forced to overcome that standard. Whether that party wins or loses on
appeal, the higher deference standard will make it appear as if that party
faced long odds due to something other than the merits. Thus, a deference
mistake will shift the law toward a given side of an issue if C2 mistakes a lower
deference standard for a higher one. And a deference mistake will shift the
law away from a given side of an issue if C2 mistakes a higher deference
standard for a lower one.
In sum, then, the number of pro-evidence deference mistakes will be:
The number of cases in which an objecting party fails to
object, loses, and appeals × the probability that C2 relies upon
a plain error case and makes a deference mistake
+
The number of cases in which a party introducing evidence
loses and appeals × the probability that C2 relies upon an
abuse-of-discretion case and makes a deference mistake
The number of anti-evidence deference mistakes will be:
The number of cases in which a party introducing evidence
does not preserve an argument, loses, and appeals × the
probability that C2 relies upon a plain error case and makes a
deference mistake
+
The number of cases in which an objecting party loses and
appeals × the probability that C2 relies upon an abuse-ofdiscretion case and makes a deference mistake
Accordingly, there will be no net movement in the law so long as the
following conditions hold:
1) C0’s errors or deviations from C1’s cutpoint are distributed evenly
around C1’s cutpoint.
2) Both sides appeal cases at equivalent rates.
3) C1’s zone of deference is symmetric around its cutpoint.
4) C2 is equally likely to make mistakes with respect to cases appealed
by each side.
5) Each side fails to preserve issues at trial at the same rate.
The first four of these conditions should be familiar from our
discussion of unitary deference standards. The first condition affects how
many opportunities there will be for one side or the other to appeal.257 The
second and third determine the rate at which one side or the other will appeal
257

See supra Section III.C.1.
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when presented with an appealable case.258 The fourth condition is the
likelihood that any given precedent will result in a deference mistake.259 We
have already discussed these points in depth and will not repeat our analysis
except to say that the points we made in III.C are equally applicable here.
As to the fifth condition,260 there is every reason to believe that the
two sides to a given issue will not fail to preserve arguments at the same rate.
The principal reason is structural. When a party seeks to introduce evidence
it is necessarily making an argument as to why that evidence is admissible.
The very fact of seeking to introduce the evidence preserves at least one
argument as to admissibility. It is thus much easier for a party seeking to
block evidence to forfeit a key argument than for the party introducing it to
do so. A quick empirical check confirms this conclusion. We ran a search on
the Westlaw database of federal circuit court opinions for [ evidence /s exclu!
/s “plain error” ], looking for cases in which evidence had been excluded but
the review was for plain error. This search returned approximately 500
results. When we replaced “exclu!” with “admi!,” in order to find cases in
which evidence was admitted and the standard of review was plain error, the
number of results jumped to 3000. We take this as a structural asymmetry in
the number of times a party will fail to preserve an objection and thus an
indication that deference mistakes may induce a long-term trend toward
greater permissiveness in the rules of evidence.
*

*

*

Deference mistakes in isolation are interesting and notable; deference
mistakes in combination hold the potential to affect the law in significant and
perhaps pernicious ways. Our objective in this Part has been to demonstrate
that deference mistakes can generate long-term evolution in the law if they
fall unequally on one side of a legal issue or the other. We cannot prove
definitively that deference mistakes have had this effect, as it is difficult to
separate the operation of deference mistakes from other factors affecting the
law over time. But in light of the theory we presented here, we think the
evidence we offered in Part II is at least suggestive of the influence that
deference mistakes might exert. In the Part that follows, we consider what
might be done to blunt this influence.

IV. Avoiding Deference Mistakes
If we are correct that courts have been making deference mistakes,
and that these mistakes are influencing doctrine, what follows? In this Part we
258
259

See supra Sections III.C.2 & 3.
See supra Section III.C.4.

260 We note that it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for generating zero net
movement in the law that C2 make deference mistakes with respect to plain error cases and abuse
of discretion cases. Even if this were true, unequal numbers of cases of each type would still lead to
long-term legal evolution. And even if this is not true, there will still be no net legal evolution if
each side appeals equal numbers of plain error and abuse of discretion cases. Of course, as we will
describe, it is unrealistic to believe that all of these conditions will hold.
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offer some suggestions regarding the ramifications of deference mistakes, the
ways in which they should alter our perceptions of certain legal doctrines, and
potential corrective mechanisms.
As an initial matter, one might wonder whether a doctrine that has
been influenced by deference mistakes is “wrong” in any normative sense,
such that there is a “correction” that should be made. We express no
normative view regarding any of the doctrines we discuss in this paper, and so
we do not mean to critique the development of any of those doctrines on
substantive terms. Yet we nonetheless believe that the process of doctrinal
evolution through deference mistakes is incorrect as a substantive, normative
matter. Implicit in our model of deference mistakes is a model of judicial
decisionmaking under which judges’ decisions are influenced to at least some
degree by the legal precedent available to them.261 Suppose, then, that there
is some normatively correct outcome in each case, but that judges are not
perfect—they will err and arrive at outcomes that are not necessarily ideal.
Any given judicial decision will deviate from the correct outcome by some
amount in some direction.
Deference mistakes represent a simple misunderstanding of one of the
inputs to a legal decision—a technical error, more or less. This technical error
increases the inaccuracy of the judge’s decision, above and beyond whatever
errors the judge might make absent a deference mistake. Thus, in
expectation, any given judicial decision will deviate even further from what is
optimal if the judge makes a deference mistake than it would if the judge did
not. On this understanding, deference mistakes would only reduce (or at least
not increase) the degree of error in judicial decisionmaking if they were
negatively correlated with other errors the judge might be making. For
instance, suppose that a judge of the Federal Circuit was ideologically antipatent, such that his decisions were biased against patent rights to a degree
that was normatively harmful. Suppose further that this same judge was
prone to making deference errors, the vast majority of which were pro-patent
because they involved infringement precedents decided under a clear-andconvincing evidence standard. In this case, the deference mistakes would
mitigate the judge’s tendency to err in an anti-patent direction.
Yet there is no reason to believe that deference mistakes will be
negatively correlated with judicial error in general. Rather, there is likely zero
correlation between the two. Deference mistakes will thus exacerbate the
errors inherent to judicial decisionmaking and lead to decisions that are
further from what is optimal than if deference mistakes did not occur. It is in
this sense that we describe deference mistakes as normatively undesirable and
search for potential correctives.
More generally, when deference mistakes occur, the evolution of
doctrine is being driven by something that most observers would agree has
nothing to do with the normatively correct outcomes. Regardless of one’s

261 See Masur, supra note 195, at 490 (citing sources); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES
THINK 40-43 (2008) (describing the process by which judges reason to decisions).
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normative view of an area of law, issues like which party appeals more
frequently, or whether a lower court is biased, or whether courts are more
likely to make one type of error than another should play no role in that
doctrine’s development. If these types of factors somehow push doctrine in a
desirable direction, that would be pure, fortunate happenstance. This is not
the way a well-designed legal system should operate.
So what can be done to reduce or eliminate deference mistakes?
The difficulty with legal solutions is that deference mistakes affect the
evolution of doctrine through the natural, informal processes of the common
law: judges read and rely upon precedent when deciding cases. Eliminating
deference mistakes would seem to require significant alterations to the
common law method. For instance, judges could simply do away with
deferential standards of review and consider every case de novo. Yet this would
seem too extreme a response. It may be that trial courts do not deserve as
much deference as they currently receive as a substantive matter, but
deference mistakes do not strike even us as so significant a problem that on
their own account they would justify eliminating deferential standards of
review.
Alternatively, one could imagine collapsing all deference regimes such
that each legal question was governed by a unitary deference standard. For
instance, patent validity might be judged by a preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard, rather than a clear-and-convincing evidence standard, even when a
patent has already been granted and is being asserted in a suit for
infringement. This would be operationally equivalent to eliminating the
deference that the PTO receives for having examined the patent in the first
instance—a result advocated by numerous legal academics.262 Again, it may
be that the PTO should not receive such deference as a substantive matter, or
that it should receive deference only under certain circumstances. But if
deference is otherwise appropriate, deference mistakes do not strike us as a
sufficiently great reason to eliminate it.
The same holds true for habeas and qualified immunity. Deference
mistakes could be reduced or avoided if courts eliminated the requirement
that a right be “clearly established” before it can serve as a basis for a habeas
or § 1983 claim. Every case would then be a straightforward consideration of
whether the right exists, with no deference to state decisionmakers. Yet this
would involve a tremendous alteration to the two doctrines, one that might be
warranted on substantive grounds but almost surely cannot be justified
merely as a means of eliminating deference mistakes.
Even if we were to eliminate some deference regimes entirely, this
might not cure the problem. As we explained above, judges might nonetheless
feel compelled to defer to patents that have already been granted or state
decisions that are already final. This type of sub silentio deference could
262 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 71, 118
(2013) (arguing for “eliminat[ing] the elevated burden of proof that applies to invalidity” and
citing many “[s]cholars and others [who] have long argued” the same).

3/15/14

DEFERENCE MISTAKES

61

generate even more errors—subsequent courts would have no idea whether or
not to trust a precedential decision—and those errors would be even more
difficult to detect or correct. Altering the formal legal rules in a fashion that
judges are likely to disobey is not a viable option. And in the patent context,
there is evidence that de facto deference to the PTO can be weakened where
appropriate without eliminating the formal asymmetry in deference regimes
that makes deference mistakes easier to detect.263
Less drastic than wholesale reformulation of deference doctrine is the
possibility that courts might instead use dicta to reduce deference mistakes.
Courts that decide issues of qualified immunity are already encouraged, as a
matter of law, to determine whether a right exists in addition to holding
whether it is “clearly established.” This rule could be extended to habeas and
to any number of other types of deference regimes. For instance, a court
considering patent’s validity in the course of an infringement lawsuit could
rule on validity under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and then
announce separately what decision it would have reached had it considered
the question without deference. Appellate courts reviewing lower court
decisions for abuse of discretion or clear error could issue their rulings and
then add advisory statements explaining what they would have done were
they considering the cases without deference. These statements would be
dicta, but that is not the point. They would constitute important information
that future courts could use to make better decisions and avoid deference
mistakes.
The greater problem is that the courts issuing such dicta might be
tempted (consciously or unconsciously) to engage in motivated reasoning, as
we mentioned above. A court that had decided that a particular right was not
clearly established might be reluctant to declare that the right exists, thus
placing all of the weight on its determination that it was not clearly
established. A court that had declared a patent valid might be loath to admit
that it would have reached a different result under a preponderance standard,
thereby acknowledging that the case was close and opening the door for an
appellate court to disagree. Or, less consciously, a court that had just decided
a case one way might be more focused on evidence that confirms that view
and thus more inclined to announce that the result would have been the same
under any deference regime.
Accordingly, a system in which courts regularly issue deferencerelated dicta might be inadvisable. If the number of errors due to motivated
reasoning would exceed the current number of deference mistakes, courts
might actually produce less accurate decisions if they were forced to speculate
263 In Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the presumption of validity should not apply when the PTO has not considered
the prior art at issue, but the Court approved the use of a jury instruction stating that the PTO
had not evaluated the evidence at issue. A study then found that mock jurors were just as likely to
find a patent invalid with a preponderance instruction with this i4i-type limitation as with a clearand-convincing-evidence instruction (and in both cases were more likely to find the patent invalid
than with a preponderance instruction alone). David L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman,
Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429 (2013).
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about outcomes under standards not before them. (This is, of course, one of
the reasons behind the “case or controversy” requirement and the general
distaste for dicta.) Accordingly, it is difficult to recommend even so limited an
intervention as requiring that courts issue dicta when deciding cases under
deferential standards. Some of the more limited measures we described
above, such as noting the deference standard in citations to a case, seem more
likely to produce net gains.
An even more limited but potentially more effective intervention
would be simply to bring the issue to the attention of judges (and their clerks)
on a systematic basis. If judges are aware of their potential to make deference
mistakes, they will likely pay more attention to the deference regimes involved
in the precedents they are citing and become less likely to err in the first
instance. If increased awareness alone is insufficient, one could imagine a set
of informal procedural norms evolving to combat the problem. For instance,
it might become standard practice when citing a case to note parenthetically
the deference regime governing the legal question at issue. To illustrate:
A condition of supervised release that bars possession of any
pornographic materials is not overbroad. United States v. Ristine,
335 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 2003) (plain error).
A medical device patent is not obvious where the record
contains no motivation to combine two similar prior art
references, and where the new device was widely copied after
it was introduced. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
688 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (clear and convincing
evidence).
Forcing judges to mention the deference regime specifically will make the
issue much more salient and force them to consider whether they are using a
case to support a legal proposition that it cannot sustain, given the deference
regime under which it was decided. It might also help prevent deference
mistakes from propagating by making clear when a court is relying
substantially upon deferential precedents. This norm could simply be an
informal practice among judges (and a requirement for the bench memos law
clerks write to help judges decide cases), or it could be instantiated in local
judicial rules or even The Bluebook.
Finally, it may simply be appropriate for courts, legislatures, litigants,
and scholars to view particular doctrines with greater skepticism because of
the possibility that those doctrines have evolved in biased fashion due to
deference mistakes. This is especially true for doctrines governed by
bifurcated deference regimes. Our model in Part III makes clear that
deference mistakes can occur under both unitary and bifurcated deference
regimes. But we also note that we suspect that deference mistakes will be
much more common in bifurcated deference regimes, and our examples of
errors are taken almost exclusively from those types of regimes. Thus, it is
possible that the bifurcated deference regime governing patent validity has
expanded the boundaries of patentability and made it easier to obtain a
patent. And it is possible that deference mistakes in habeas and § 1983 cases
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have led courts to unwittingly contract the scope of federal procedural rights.
Policymakers, litigants, and scholars who examine these doctrines should not
necessarily treat them exclusively as the product of years of common-law
wisdom, enshrining truths that may not be visible to the human eye.264
Rather, in many cases they may be the product of the most human of
mistakes.
We admit that it must be tempting to believe that any error that could
be eliminated so easily—just pay closer attention to precedent!—really
presents a significant problem. Perhaps it does not; we have no way of
proving definitively to the contrary. But given the theory that predicts
deference mistakes, and the numerous examples we have found, we believe it
would be naïve to ignore the issue. Accordingly, some type of intervention—
even, or perhaps especially, a very mild one—may well be warranted.

Conclusion
The proposition that courts should understand the deference regimes
at issue in the precedents they cite might seem banal, and the cases in which
courts fail to do so might seem like minor errors. Yet we have shown that
such deference mistakes are commonplace in areas ranging from criminal
procedure to patent law, and that they can have pernicious effects on
doctrinal development. The cumulative effect of deference mistakes may be
partly responsible for doctrinal shifts such as the inflation in the boundaries of
patentability, the retrenchment in the law of criminal procedure rights, and
the pro-employer shift in employment discrimination law.
We have argued that requiring courts to be more explicit about
deference might reduce the number of formal legal errors, but also
(counterintuitively) might exacerbate the underlying problem due to judges’
efforts to avoid cognitive dissonance. Unless judges become more comfortable
admitting ambiguities, the best solution may be to increase awareness of
problem of deference mistakes among actors throughout the legal system,
helping these actors to recognize deference mistakes when they occur.

264 We recognize that many participants in the legal system already view existing law with a
jaundiced eye, but there are of course parties who are much more deferential to the law on the
books and the reasoning that underlies it.
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